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Abstract 
 
My thesis aims to show that Wittgenstein’s view of rule-following involves a misleading 
picture of the rule.  Since he saw the rule as something fundamentally independent of the 
rule-follower and something with which the rule-follower must comply, he inevitably 
became entangled in the paradox of compliance: that is, the idea that there must be 
something other than the rule-follower for rule-following to exist, even though he knew 
that there was really nothing there to guide the rule-follower or to measure his action.  This 
paradox, dimly expressed within key Wittgensteinian problems relating to how one is able 
to follow a rule and whether one can follow a rule ‘privately’, eventually gave rise to the 
question over the social nature of rules.  In that debate, Wittgenstein’s commentators 
vigorously argued, and continue to argue, whether the concept of rule-following 
presupposes a community of practitioners or not.  I argue that this debate itself is 
misguided, since both sides in this debate take as their starting point a picture of 
compliance which sees rule and rule-follower as essentially different.  In contrast to a 
‘compliant’ picture, I offer a different picture of the rule, which I will call the ‘pliant 
picture of the rule’.  I will show that rule and rule-follower are fundamentally the same, and 
are related to one another, not socially or grammatically, but genealogically.  This 
relationship of identity is in fact exhibited in the relationship between teacher and pupil, 
when the pupil becomes what his teacher already is through following his teacher. 
Although compliance can be said to define this relationship initially, it ends with the pupil 
learning, or becoming, the rule.  To conceive of the rule in this way is to avoid the paradox 
of compliance; that is, it is to go beyond Wittgenstein’s picture of a paradox. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Wittgenstein asks the following question, 
after noting that a rule allows one to hold by it just as much as it can be said to compel one 
to act in a certain way:  
My question really was: ‘How can one hold by a rule?’  And the picture that might 
occur to someone here is that of a short bit of handrail, by means of which I am to let 
myself be guided further than the rail reaches. [But there is nothing there; but there 
isn’t nothing there!]  For when I ask ‘How can one…’, that means that something 
here looks paradoxical to me; and so a picture is confusing me. (RFM-V.45) 
 
What Wittgenstein is saying here is that the missing part of handrail in this picture of the 
rule is not really missing after all; the extension of this short bit of handrail is paradoxically 
both there and not there.  If that missing part of handrail really were missing, one might 
reasonably ask, how could that short bit of handrail still function as a rule for us?  In fact, 
if this is one’s picture of the rule, how could one not be puzzled about how one is able to 
follow a rule?  This question itself seems drawn right into such a paradoxical picture of the 
rule.  And the picture, confusing as it is, seems as inescapable as the question it gives rise 
to.  Yet this captivating picture of the rule continued to hold Wittgenstein’s thinking 
captive, despite his vigilance against being held captive by misleading pictures. 
     There is, however, more to this picture than meets the eye.  Although Wittgenstein 
could see its paradoxical nature and knew that his question was the result of a confusing 
picture, he nevertheless could not solve the paradox, because he did not see the deeper 
picture underlying this picture of the rule as a handrail.  His answer to his question, 
therefore, was not to reject this picture outright and to replace it with another, but to work 
around it by seeing rule-following as something akin to obeying an order.  He saw rule-
following as the outcome of a similar kind of training that both eliminated the possibility of 
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choosing different courses of action and emphasized the formation of habit, conditioned 
responses, practice, custom.  In his own paradoxical way of stating his position, he finally 
said: ‘When I follow a rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly’ (PI 219).  That is 
why the missing part of handrail does not really need to be there: one does not need to see 
the rule (or hold onto it) in order to choose which way to proceed, because one acts blindly 
anyway; and because one simply acts the way one has been trained to act, as a matter of 
course, the missing part is not really missing after all: one’s training supplies the missing 
part of the handrail.  Looking at rule-following in this way, Wittgenstein was able to 
provide a paradoxical answer to the question arising from his paradoxical picture of the 
rule, that is, ‘How am I able to follow the rule?’—‘I follow the rule blindly’.   ‘Following 
the rule blindly’ is a paradoxical notion, unlike simply acting blindly—for example, 
‘following one’s instincts’—since following is here a deliberate action involving 
something one chooses to follow.  This is why rule-following is a normative activity, 
unlike actions done from instinct, since rule-following implies doing something on 
purpose, correctly or incorrectly.  As we shall later see, Wittgenstein and his followers did 
not and could not abandon this normative sense of ‘following’; they simply switched to a 
non-normative sense when it suited them.  In the case of the rule as handrail, this switch 
happened when it became obvious that there really was nothing independent of the rule-
follower to guide him when following the rule—hence the reliance on custom, inclination, 
the continuation of past performance, conditioned responses, ‘complete confidence’, or 
something else amounting to following a rule ‘blindly’.  Thus, instead of rejecting this 
paradoxical picture of the rule and the question that went with it, Wittgenstein simply 
reaffirmed the picture by giving an equally paradoxical answer to it1.  His answer was 
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therefore not a genuine solution to his question (in the sense of ‘dissolving’ it) but the 
philosophical equivalent of a programmer’s ‘hack’—that is, it was essentially a clever 
work-around solution to a deeper problem he had yet to grapple with—the problem of 
compliance. 
     What Wittgenstein had actually stumbled upon with his notion of ‘following the rule 
blindly’ was the paradoxical nature of symbolic representation, that is, the nature of the 
sign itself.  Guided by the picture of the rule as handrail, he was merely describing this 
same picture, although this picture was no longer the picture of the rule at all, but only that 
of the sign.  What he was really describing with this notion is one aspect or moment of 
what I will call ‘abstraction’.  Abstraction is essentially the reduction of a whole to a part 
through some medium, or its change from independence to dependence—without actually 
altering what is whole or independent.  It is really the nature of metaphor.   Such 
abstraction occurs in perception, for example, when we see or hear something: what is seen 
or heard has been reduced abstractly in perception to the manner in which we perceive it 
through our eyes and ears.  Similarly, abstraction occurs within the institution of slavery, 
when a free-born and independent human being is reduced abstractly in society to an 
instrument for another and becomes another’s property.  In the case of the sign, just as in 
the case of a tool, a similar abstraction occurs when a mark or sound is reduced abstractly 
in language to something useful, that is, when we do something else with it besides merely 
writing or speaking this sign.  ‘Following the rule blindly’ was just Wittgenstein’s 
expression for the mere production of this mark or sound that occurs in such abstraction.  
He was really just noting that symbolic marks or sounds have no ‘intrinsic meaning’, that 
is, they have no independent nature qua sign determining their production, and so nothing 
 4
about this mark or sound can guide me in speaking or writing them.  Hence abstraction has 
a connection to the so-called ‘arbitrariness and autonomy of grammar’.  Since abstraction 
always occurs within some medium of reduction, the medium’s own intrinsic nature is 
simply ignored yet exploited at the same time—only thereby does it become something 
else, that is, it now takes on another meaning, another identity—an identity other than what 
it has by nature. 
     Abstraction is thus like a second nature, a form of identity imposed on a thing by its 
usefulness for some end or other.  This identity is not ‘intrinsic’ to the thing but ‘extrinsic’; 
the thing has its ‘abstract’ meaning in virtue of a purpose it now serves for another.  A tool 
is a kind of ‘abstract object’ in this sense, and Aristotle’s famous example of an axe is one 
such example of abstraction: what an axe is by nature is really the nature of the material out 
of which it is made—iron or bronze—but its functional use, or the activity of cutting, gives 
this iron or bronze the identity it properly has as an axe, that is, an axe is an axe in virtue of 
the purpose for which this iron or bronze is used.  But this functional use does not 
obliterate the intrinsic identity of the axe—its nature qua iron or bronze—but instead 
exploits this identity, ignoring everything else about the nature of iron or bronze other than 
what is useful for this end.  Iron’s solidity and hardness are useful in an axe, but its colour 
and taste are not, although it has these also by nature.  Abstraction, consequently, ignores 
the true nature of the axe, the material out of which it is made, except as it relates to the 
usefulness of this material, and this overlooking of the axe’s true nature is a form of 
‘blindness’, signaling the axe’s independence qua axe from its material substrate.  In other 
words, the axe qua axe is simply not iron or bronze; but qua mere substrate, it is iron or 
bronze. The axe is thus both iron (or bronze) and not iron (or bronze). 
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   Wittgenstein’s answer to his paradoxical picture of the rule, therefore, involved turning a 
blind eye to the normative nature of the rule while simultaneously acknowledging it, since 
the picture of the rule as handrail represents something independent of the rule-follower 
and his action.  In other words, the handrail in this picture of the rule just is the rule’s 
normativity figuratively expressed and then conspicuously overlooked through ‘blindness’.  
The act of following the rule blindly is thus a form of ‘abstract’ action: it is an action 
simply done, that is, it is something now done for its own sake—an action free of any 
consequences for the one who acts; in the case of the sign, it is the sign looked at simply as 
the production of a mark or sound, or, as I will phrase it, it is the sign qua mere use.  The 
sign qua mere use is thus analogous to the axe qua material substrate. In this simplicity of 
action or mere use resides its usefulness under abstraction, just as the slave is made useful 
to society by acting without regard to his own desires or needs under ‘blind obedience’ to 
another.  Unless the mere production of a mark or sound is made useful under abstraction, 
it has no ‘meaning’, no identity at all, other than as a mark or sound.  And because this 
picture of the rule as handrail is also a picture of compliance, it should be no surprise that 
compliance itself is a deep-rooted problem for Wittgenstein: ‘following the rule blindly’ is 
really a public rejection of this handrail without the deeper rejection of compliance. It is the 
picture of a paradox—the picture of a rule that is there yet not there. 
     Wittgenstein’s paradoxical answer may have satisfied some as an answer to the question 
arising from his paradoxical picture, but the paradox in question goes deeper than what that 
one question asks.  Because his paradoxical picture involves a deeper picture that itself 
gives rise to the paradox, this deeper picture simply resurfaced in the guise of another 
central question that Wittgenstein posed—“Is it possible to follow a rule ‘privately’”? 2 
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Wittgenstein said no, “otherwise thinking one was following a rule would be the same 
thing as following it.”  But this second question and answer gave no hint of a paradox, 
although it later gave rise to a debate among his commentators that centered on the role of 
the community in rule-following.  This second question now revolved around the picture of 
the rule as a measure and no longer as a guide.  In fact, it is only because of this later 
debate that the paradox now had a chance to show itself as the main obstacle to a 
satisfactory resolution to the question of the role of the community in rule-following, a 
debate that still continues unabated to this day, over twenty-five years since it resurfaced in 
full force with the publication of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private 
Language.  One camp in this dispute, the so-called ‘community view’ endorsed by Kripke 
himself, sees rule-following as essentially requiring a community of rule-followers in order 
to establish the normative nature of rules (the rule as measure), whereas the other camp, the 
so-called ‘individualist view’, primarily defended by G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, does 
not see such a requirement.  But both sides still agree with what Wittgenstein said in PI 
202, namely, that one cannot follow a rule ‘privately’; both sides agree that there must be a 
difference between thinking one is following a rule and following a rule; these two cannot 
be the same without destroying the concept of normativity that is essential to the concept of 
rule-following.  For them, this also means that the rule-follower must be different from the 
rule, since it is the rule that determines, independently of the rule-follower, whether the 
rule-follower has followed the rule; it cannot be the rule-follower himself that determines 
this.  But this line of argument essentially presupposes the same deeper picture of the rule 
that Wittgenstein invoked in RFM-V.45 through the picture of the rule as a guide for the 
rule-follower; in fact, the rule has also been compared by some to a ‘yardstick’: the 
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‘yardstick’ is thus, along with the ‘handrail’, a paradigm of the rule3.  This deeper picture 
could justifiably be said to be the compliant picture of the rule, since it is the picture of 
something independent of the rule-follower with which the rule-follower must comply or 
be in accord in order to be said to follow the rule4.  This picture of compliance, however, 
leads ultimately to the paradox of compliance: the idea that there must be something other 
than the rule-follower for there to be rule-following, even though there really is nothing 
independent of him either to guide him or to measure his action.  Both sides in this 
interminable debate, therefore, merely represent the two sides of the paradox: ‘there is 
nothing there (there need be no community), but there isn’t nothing there (there must be a 
community)!’ This deeper paradox thus partly explains why both sides have at least one leg 
to stand on in this debate and why neither side has won out over the other in any conclusive 
manner.  It never occurred to either side, though, just as it never occurred to Wittgenstein, 
to question this underlying picture of compliance, since it seems so self-evident that rules 
and compliance go hand in hand5.  
     My thesis, then, can be succinctly summarized in this way: the compliant picture of the 
rule sees rule-follower and rule as different, such that the rule-follower must act in a way 
that complies with the rule or is in accord with the rule; it sees this difference as 
prerequisite for normativity, since normativity is said on this account to presuppose another 
difference, namely, the difference between what is right and what merely seems right to the 
rule-follower.  This latter difference demands that both rule and rule-follower be different 
and not the same: “hence it is impossible to follow a rule ‘privately’”.  But there is another 
picture of the rule, however, the pliant picture of the rule, that sees rule-follower and rule 
as the same; compliance makes no sense (or no difference) if these two are the same; but 
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far from abolishing normativity, this identity of the two makes normativity, that is, what is 
correct and incorrect, part of the rule-follower’s understanding itself, since what truly 
makes the rule pliant is the rule-follower’s grasp of the purpose of the rule.  The rule-
follower who only understands how to follow the rule—that is, ‘follow the rule blindly’—
need not grasp the purpose of the rule: hence the need for the rule to still be different from 
the rule-follower; one cannot follow a rule ‘privately’ in this sense, if one cannot determine 
for oneself whether one’s own action is correct or incorrect; but in the pliant picture of the 
rule, the rule-follower must also grasp the purpose of the rule even more than how he is to 
follow it; and once he does that, the rule-follower becomes the rule: rule-follower and rule 
are now one and the same.  My understanding, or grasping of the purpose, of the rule, in 
other words, is the rule in the truest sense. Wittgenstein, I argue, was still working within a 
compliant picture of the rule—the basis of his paradoxical picture of the rule as a handrail 
and the presupposition of the claim that one cannot follow a rule ‘privately’—just as his 
commentators still are today.  My thesis is an attempt to show a different picture—a pliant 
picture of the rule. 
     The implications of these two pictures of the rule are far-reaching and should not be 
underestimated; indeed, it is my contention that the compliant picture of the rule involves a 
paradox about rule-following that cannot be resolved in the current debate over the role of 
the community.  For one, both pictures entail different conceptions of independence for the 
rule-follower.  Under the compliant picture, the rule-follower remains dependent on the 
rule in an important sense, however that rule is understood, so long as rule and rule-
follower are said to be different and the rule is conceived here as either a guide or a 
measure for the rule-follower: it is in fact the rule which needs to be truly independent in 
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this relation and not the rule-follower, since the rule is also supposed to be the justification 
for the rule-follower’s action and what he appeals to when he justifies his action (PI 217), 
and “justification consists in appealing to something independent” (PI 265).  The pliant 
picture of the rule, on the other hand, entails a fundamentally different conception of 
independence, since if rule and rule-follower are the same, the rule-follower cannot be said 
to be dependent on the rule at all (except in the initial form of the relation—that between 
teacher and pupil), and uses the rule as neither a guide nor a measure for his action: it is 
this identity of the rule-follower with the rule that constitutes the true independence of the 
rule-follower, since he is now no longer dependent on anyone or anything else in order to 
be a rule-follower.  The question of independence for the rule-follower, then, is intimately 
tied to one’s particular picture of the rule; and the truth of this independence will reveal to 
us whether it has any substance at all. 
     The truth is that the compliant picture of the rule talks about independence—or in 
Wittgenstein’s case, ‘mastery of a technique’—in a way that is at odds with true 
independence and genuine ‘mastery’.  In this respect, the compliant picture’s conception of 
independence for the rule-follower has similarities to Hegel’s discussion of the independent 
and dependent forms of self-consciousness in the well-known ‘master and slave’ section of 
his Phenomenology of Spirit.  Suffice it to say here that there is also a paradox in Hegel’s 
discussion—one that he explicitly brings out in the reversal of the master’s concept of 
himself—a paradox arising within a relation that is by its nature unequal but has as its 
raison d’être the attainment of equality, or in Hegel’s terminology, ‘mutual recognition’.  
In Hegel’s view, this relation is ultimately destined to fail, because the master cannot 
achieve his intended goal of ‘mutual recognition’ within it, for the simple reason that the 
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truth of the master, his certainty of himself as an independent form of self-consciousness, is 
not another like himself but in fact the slave; his concept of himself in this relation is thus 
frustrated, because he cannot find himself objectively in this other, and so the master’s 
concept of himself in this relation finds no satisfaction, no corresponding ‘object’.  And as 
the master’s concept of himself goes, so goes the compliant picture of the rule; for it, too, is 
destined to fail in the end, and for similar reasons, since the rule of the compliant picture is 
ultimately an empty rule, a mere sign.  The pliant picture of the rule does not produce such 
paradoxes, because it does not conceive of the relation between rule and rule-follower in 
the same way: the relation is indeed not equal at first, when the relation is manifested in the 
asymmetric relation between teacher (the rule) and pupil (the rule-follower); but teacher 
and pupil are not related as master is to slave, since the pupil, though dependent on his 
teacher, is actually learning to become what his teacher already is, that is, a rule himself.  
Thus the relation between rule and rule-follower in the pliant picture of the rule is 
fundamentally ‘genealogical’ in nature and not merely ‘instrumental’—nor even ‘social’, 
properly speaking—since the rule-follower, by following the rule for himself, eventually 
becomes the rule, that is, both terms of the relation become the same: this genealogical 
transformation from difference back into identity reveals the essential nature of rule-
following. 
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Notes for the Introduction 
 
1. See note 2 of Chapter 1 for more discussion of the paradoxical nature of Wittgenstein’s 
claim that “I follow the rule blindly”. 
 
2. cf. PI 202.  The two most prominent and important questions Wittgenstein asks in his 
rule-following discussion in Philosophical Investigations are “How is one able to follow a 
rule?” (cf. PI 211, PI 212, PI 217, PI 219) and ‘Is it possible to follow a rule privately?’ (cf. 
PI 202, PI 258, PI 265, and PI 270).  The first question could be said to arise from the 
picture of the rule as a guide, the second from the picture of the rule as a measure.  Taken 
together, these peculiar questions are related directly to the deeper paradoxical picture of 
RFM V.45 and are really just symptoms of the same underlying condition, namely, a 
distorted picture of rule-following that sees the rule as compliant in nature.  The so-called 
‘paradox of interpretation’ discussion—the basis of Kripke’s controversial sceptical take on 
Wittgenstein’s view of rule-following—is likewise an outgrowth of the picture of the rule 
as both a guide and a measure, since new applications of the rule are thought to be like 
invisible extensions of the rule as guide that now ‘hang in the air’ as interpretations; and 
the problem with these interpretations—the idea that any extension of the rule can be made 
out to accord with the rule—only finds its solution in custom or in what we call ‘following 
the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases (PI 199, PI 201).  Unfortunately, the 
invocation of “what we call ‘following the rule’” as a solution to this problem is as empty 
and ornamental as our giving definitions merely for the sake of their form (cf. PI 219).  The 
only genuine problem of interpretation is encountered within the teacher-pupil relation, 
when rule and rule-follower are still different from one another as teacher is to pupil; but 
this problem is easily solved by teaching the pupil how to follow the rule, that is, by having 
the rule-follower become the rule.  (The compliant picture of the rule is thus the legacy of 
the teacher-pupil relation, though this relation is only the initial form that rule-following 
takes before it matures into fully fledged rule-following.)  This view of the problem of 
interpretation is taken up in Chapter One and Chapter Two. 
 
3. “The rule is the yardstick against which the act is measured.” (G.P. Baker and P.M.S. 
Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity.  Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1985. p. 
151). 
 
4. The word ‘compliant’ in the expression ‘compliant picture of the rule’ is used here, not 
to modify ‘picture’, but ‘rule’ in the sense that the picture under investigation is about a 
rule which is compliant in nature, or which involves compliance.  It is meant to contrast 
with the word ‘pliant’ in the expression ‘pliant picture of the rule’, where the rule is 
pictured as something that is notably not compliant in nature but something now identified 
with the rule-follower himself—a living being.  Later on I will simplify the above 
expressions by referring to the ‘compliant rule’ and ‘pliant rule’: these adjectives are 
primarily meant to refer to the nature of the two different rules depicted throughout the 
thesis. 
 
5. Compliance with a rule is not genuinely analogous to compliance with the law or 
compliance with an order.  Judges determine the compliance of citizens with the law and 
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commanders determine the compliance of subordinates with orders, but no one determines 
the compliance of rule-followers with rules in a similar way, except when the pupil is 
learning to follow a rule from his teacher (a special relation in rule-following), or when 
certain professional societies are established within practices for the purposes of 
establishing universal standards for its members (such rules are secondary rules and are 
merely derivative in nature); compliance within these societies is not the same kind of 
compliance associated with the rule per se.  It is a mistake of the community view of rule-
following to think of the community as fulfilling such a role.   
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Chapter One: ‘Mastery of a Technique’ 
 
 
1.1 ‘Mastery of a Technique’ and ‘Following a Rule’: A Question of Independence 
 
     Wittgenstein uses the expression ‘mastery of a technique’ (eine Technik beherrschen) 
several times in the Philosophical Investigations.  In PI 150 and PI 199, ‘mastery of a 
technique’ is connected with the ability to do something, with understanding how to do 
something: to speak a language, for instance.  In PI 692, it is brought in as a criterion of 
someone meaning such-and-such when he instructed someone else, even though he neither 
said nor thought explicitly what he meant him to do in every case.  These instances of the 
expression indicate that for Wittgenstein one who has ‘mastery of a technique’ is simply 
someone who knows how to speak a language, calculate a math problem, or play a game.  
In fact, the two key words of the expression, ‘mastery’ and ‘technique’, are found in other 
expressions that mean much the same.  For instance, in PI 20 and PI 33 he speaks of 
‘mastery of this language’ and how one ‘must already be master of a language in order to 
understand an ostensive definition’.  In PI 31, someone can understand the place of a 
chessman in a game when shown its shape because he is ‘already master of a game’.  
‘Technique’, therefore, is akin in this expression to a language, a game.  In PI 125, 
Wittgenstein says explicitly what he means by ‘technique’: ‘…we lay down rules, a 
technique, for a game…”.  Someone who has ‘mastery of a technique’, then, is someone 
who knows how to follow the rules of some activity. 
     The expression ‘following a rule’, by contrast, reflects—on my account—the fact that 
one human being can imitate or follow another, and this is what I will claim the expression 
means or makes reference to in this deeper sense of ‘following’: rule-following is 
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essentially the imitation of action of one individual by another.  At first one individual 
follows the other, who is the rule for him, and so he himself is in fact learning to become 
just such a rule, too.  By understanding the expression in this way, it is possible to look at 
rule-following from a different vantage point than the usual one that sees the rule as a 
yardstick or handrail that measures or guides the rule-follower: the rule-follower really is 
the rule, and the name of ‘rule-follower’ no longer indicates what he does now in relation 
to another, namely, follow him, but rather how he became who he is.  To fail to see this 
meaning in the expression ‘following a rule’ is in the end to misunderstand in a 
fundamental way what rule-following is, since this understanding of the expression shows 
us clearly that the relation between rule and rule-follower is a living relation that only 
initially exists as the difference between one human being and another but eventually exists 
as a genealogical identity, that is, as the identity of the rule-follower with the rule he has 
learnt to follow—it is no longer a lifeless abstract difference between an independent rule 
and a rule-follower who must now somehow conform himself to it, using it as either a 
guide or a measure of his action. 
     The relation between rule and rule-follower, therefore, is better expressed for us in the 
living relationship between teacher and pupil, which is the transitional relation between the 
rule-follower literally speaking and the rule—the transition from rule-follower to rule.  But 
attaining so-called ‘mastery of a technique’ for the pupil is not so straightforward as simply 
requiring that he act as we all do.  We are skewed in the wrong direction here by 
superficially reflecting on our own descriptions of rule-following, the same descriptions 
that we often use when we are teaching others how to follow a rule.  For example, when we 
talk about the teacher and the pupil, we naturally assume the teacher is instructing the pupil 
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as we would teach him, although we know the teacher is not infallible.  After all, the 
teacher can be said by us to make mistakes, too.  But if the teacher is not meant to be like 
us in any particular example (that is, we have described him as being in error), then whom 
do we say the pupil is to follow in such circumstances?  His teacher still, of course, since in 
our description of rule-following there are really only two human beings involved, the 
teacher and the pupil; and so in this case, if the pupil refuses to accept the instruction or 
correction of his teacher, we say that he has either failed to understand the rule as the 
teacher understands it, or failed to understand anything at all, or perhaps he did follow the 
rule after all, despite his teacher’s error.  In all such cases, we reserve for ourselves, as 
describers of rule-following, the right to judge the pupil so, and the teacher, too: 
independence and mastery are said to belong to the pupil (and teacher) only if we say that 
they do, on the grounds that what we now describe as correct rule-following is what we 
would instruct anyone else to do, even though our attributions of independence and mastery 
to the pupil imply that the pupil is no longer dependent on anyone’s judgment, even ours, 
since we are not really teaching those whom we describe to become anything at all; our 
descriptions here merely overlap with how we would instruct others to follow a rule; those 
who listen to our descriptions of rule-following are now like the pupil being taught how to 
follow the rule.  The ‘independence’ or ‘mastery’ attributed to the pupil in our descriptions 
of rule-following is therefore not genuine independence or mastery but simply conditional 
forms of independence and mastery—both are still conditioned by our description of 
correct rule-following. 
     The difficulty, then, in describing the relation between teacher and pupil seems to be in 
fully recognizing teacher and pupil as independent like us and also equal in this 
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independence without subjecting such individuals in our descriptions to the condition that 
they be the same as us, since the pupil, too, if he were truly independent, could now say the 
same as we do or not, that is, he could say that we are the same as him even if we say we 
are different, and vice versa; he presumably would also have the power of speech, and 
could give descriptions of his own actions, just as we do.  We must therefore bargain away 
our own unquestioned independence and mastery as the price of accepting the 
independence and mastery of the pupil in following the rule, even in our descriptions of 
him.  We will still describe him as we must do, and say what he does now is correct or not, 
but his independence and mastery, if he really has them, are not something so insubstantial 
as to turn now merely on the turns of our descriptions of him acting correctly or not:  the 
parity found among peers is an acceptance that extends beyond this or that judgment by 
others; this parity becomes, one might say, an ongoing test of the breaking tolerance for a 
rule which is no longer compliant in nature but pliant.  For the one thing that we have not 
bargained out of our acceptance of the pupil is the common ground on which we both 
stand, and this ground is the purpose of the rule, that for the sake of which it exists at all: 
everything else stands by itself or falls on that ground.  One’s ability to grasp that is the 
true test of independence, both for us and for those whom we describe. 
     It is important, therefore, when describing the interaction between teacher and pupil, to 
also acknowledge the fundamental difference between ourselves as describers, and hence in 
some sense as judges of whomever we describe, and our descriptions of the relation 
between the teacher and his pupil, because we can easily take the pupil or teacher as our 
pupil when we describe him.  But the teacher and pupil are really acting in these 
descriptions only as proxies for us: our descriptions of them acting correctly will go only as 
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far as we are prepared to go; and so we say that both are following a rule insofar as they do 
what we do.  The danger for us as describers, then, is that through our descriptions of the 
teacher and the pupil we unwittingly make ourselves unimpeachable judges of both and in 
effect the rule against which both are to be measured, and this rather unassuming 
assumption, as said earlier, only gives us the impression that the rule is really something 
external and independent of any rule-follower, both teacher and pupil.  Thus the pupil’s 
independence and mastery, and even the teacher’s, are still conditioned on us, on what we 
call ‘following the rule’.  We fail to understand that, if the teacher and pupil do in fact have 
‘mastery of a technique’ and can also justify their actions in following the rule—and that 
means they can therefore disagree with our descriptions of them—only then do they truly 
have ‘mastery of a technique’.  True independence, therefore, cannot consist in someone’s 
conformity to what we describe as correct rule-following but only in someone’s equally 
grasping what another is doing, and this includes what we as describers do, since in doing 
so, two human beings have come together in agreement on equal terms.  Having come to 
terms with another as an equal or peer is proof that independence and mastery have finally 
been attained.  Some nations have gone to war with another expressly to establish such 
terms of peace as evidence that independence has actually been achieved—and most of 
these even have their own flag to prove it, since a national flag is a symbol of a nation’s 
independence from others. 
     ‘Mastery of a technique’, however, seems to be understood by Wittgenstein as simply 
the ability to do something correctly.  The pupil, for example, “after some efforts on the 
teacher’s part … continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it.  So now we can say he 
has mastered the system” (PI 145).  But the pupil’s ability here, as Wittgenstein puts it, is 
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merely to do it “as we do it”; and his mastery really extends no further than ours, since he 
has become our ‘pupil’ in virtue of our describing him as we do.  The pupil, in other words, 
is following a rule insofar as he is following us, and whatever independence and mastery he 
has now is in virtue of his conformity to us and what we do.  We are the rule for him.  But 
where is the rule for us?  And how is our independence and mastery connected to this rule?  
And what do the pupil’s independence and mastery amount to if they are only borrowed 
from us and are granted to him through us?  We must again recognize that the relation 
between ourselves as describers and the pupil thus described is not a genuine relation 
between teacher and pupil but an imaginary one, since any pupil thus described will never 
really become independent of us (since in these described cases he is really just a reflection 
of us—he is ‘us’): hence any such ‘mastery of a technique’ attributed to the pupil is not a 
genuine mastery of anything, insofar as it is just a description of what the pupil is doing 
when he conforms to what we do. 
     One might respond by asking how else are we to describe the teacher and the pupil if 
not as doing this or that correctly or incorrectly?  But it is not a matter of describing them 
differently (let alone ‘correctly’) but of acknowledging that these descriptions are masked 
instructions for rule-following, and so they mislead us in understanding rule-following, 
unless we are actually using these descriptions to teach someone else how to follow a rule 
that we already understand.  If we think of these descriptions, however, as what we would 
instruct our own pupil to do, that is, as rules in the form of rule-formulations, we 
undermine the notion of independence and mastery that we then attribute to those whom 
we describe: our descriptions of rule-following will have slipped unawares into 
prescriptions of rule-following, however innocent our descriptions may sound.  We then 
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re-enforce in this way the difference between rule and rule-follower by forcing the rule-
follower we describe to ‘agree’ with us as describers, on pain of losing the grammatical 
title of ‘rule-follower’; consequently, our describing the pupil acting thus-and-so itself 
inadvertently preserves the fixed and abstract difference between rule and rule-follower 
found in our language, even after the rule-follower is said to have learned the rule from his 
teacher and no longer needs him; we describers are still the rule and the pupil whom we 
describe is still the rule-follower—this unspoken abstract relation remains deeply 
embedded in our thinking about rule-following, and so, too, is the abstract difference that 
constitutes this relation.  In the end, we need a more substantial notion of independence and 
mastery than offered by Wittgenstein, for without one, certain paradoxes about the rule will 
continue to dog our discussion of rule-following.  We also need, therefore, a more 
substantial notion of the rule; and in a way I have already given it: the rule is really a 
human being qua rule-follower.  The rule-follower just is the rule. 
 
1.2  The Rule-follower is the Rule 
 
      It may at first appear objectionable that a mere human being could be the rule, and hence a 
standard, for someone else, and so transcend every rule-formulation in the sense of being 
exempt from either being in accord with it or not being in accord with it.  This is because we 
know that human beings are fallible and make mistakes, and so it would be impossible for a 
human being to be exempt in this way; rules hold for everyone at all times, without exception, 
even the expert, like a law of nature.  But this thinking is misguided.  Wittgenstein showed in 
PI 50 that no exceptional quality attaches to the standard object itself, despite its ‘transcending’ 
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nature; it achieves its status because of the role it plays in a given activity1.  Consider 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth, for example: in the fictional world of Macbeth, certain things were 
said and certain things done by various characters.  On whose authority do we know this?  
Shakespeare’s, of course, because he wrote the play; Shakespeare is, as it were, an expert on 
the world of Macbeth; he has a privileged status.  If a dispute arose among commentators as to 
what was or was not said by various characters, Shakespeare’s play, the standard edition, is the 
measure by which we judge who is right or wrong.  And if Shakespeare were alive, he could 
also tell us things in his fictional world which are not included in the play.  Perhaps he might 
have written a sequel to the play.  Shakespeare himself is entitled to do this: it is the 
prerogative of authors to be the master of their own worlds of fiction, the undisputed authority, 
and so the standard.  It makes no sense to ask whether Shakespeare is right or wrong in what he 
says in those works, whether they correspond to some other reality that would vouchsafe their 
truth.  They are ‘necessarily true’ in the world of Macbeth, because Shakespeare said them.  
And even if we talk of a written text as being the standard, the ground of its authority must still 
be Shakespeare himself, a human being, the man who wrote the text. 
     In what sense, then, could one say that the rule-follower follows the rule blindly?2  If the 
rule is really different from the rule-follower, what difference could that rule possibly make if 
he just follows the rule blindly in the end?  What use would the rule be for him?  What 
‘essential’ role would it play in his actions?  It is as if the rule itself had somehow been set free 
of its visible, tangible formulation, only to become something elusive and dark, yet still there, 
like nebulous dark matter.  Wittgenstein’s expression ‘following the rule blindly’ in PI 219 
seems to point out for us the perplexing gap between the rule and its formulation, that is, 
between the rule-formulation and its extension.  But if we are in fact following the rule and not 
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merely its formulation, then indeed we do seem to be acting ‘blindly’, since only the rule’s 
formulation is visible and audible to the rule-follower—whatever else is there to follow is 
neither seen nor heard.  Hence there is nothing really there to choose from when following the 
rule.  But can one have a rule-formulation without a rule?  Wittgenstein comes dangerously 
close to getting rid of the rule itself by making it useless to the rule-follower. 
     But what if the rule-follower really is the rule after all?  The rule-follower suffers no 
anguish in his decisions, because he has identified himself with his craft and is the drafter of its 
implementation, the result of which is an expression of his expectations, purpose, and 
intention.  One who has ‘mastery of a technique’ takes orders from no one, obeys no rules in 
the manner a servile pupil is thought to do.  The problem of interpretation cannot even gain a 
foothold in his case, since there is nothing to interpret; there is only that which bends to his 
rule.  It would be better to say that the rule-formulation follows him.  Indeed, the pupil does, 
too.  This is because to have mastery of a technique is really to have mastery of one’s 
environment.  For the baker, this environment includes not only the ingredients, but the bakery 
conditions (e.g., temperature, humidity), equipment, and assistants, if he has any.  Over this 
environment he rules, and this means that he can adjust his conditions to suit himself and to 
optimize his procedures and results; the rule-follower is precisely that which is not conditioned 
in rule-following.  His training is therefore not a passive training or conditioning, since he 
learns to follow the rule by imitating his teacher, and imitation is not passive but active; it is 
the way the rule-follower learns to grasp the purpose of the rule.  The rule-follower, in other 
words, is the active principle in rule-following; and this active principle just is the rule. 
     If we think of the rule-follower as the rule, then, we have a way of looking at the relation 
between rule and rule-follower that views them as essentially the same.  We can see the 
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expert’s action as an expression or manifestation of the rule; and if we then think of the novice 
rule-follower as someone learning to become the rule, we can see his action as an 
interpretation of the rule.  The angle of our perspective here is either from the expert acting 
(manifesting the rule) or from the non-expert acting (interpreting the rule).  For the novice rule-
follower, acting on a rule is like giving interpretations of the rule, because we first learn to 
follow the rule in this way, through imitating the action of the expert and responding to his 
cues.  This in fact is the rationale for training; the pupil is acting as a mediator of his teacher 
through his own imitation of his teacher, since the teacher can be said in an important sense 
both to initiate the action of the pupil by getting the pupil to imitate him in the first place and to 
complete it by judging the result to be correct or not: the teacher, as rule for the pupil, at first 
guides the pupil to begin his action and later measures the pupil to complete this action; and so 
the pupil here stands as an interpreter of the rule for the teacher until he learns to follow the 
rule by himself: the pupil’s action, in other words, still hangs in the air as an interpretation of 
the rule until the teacher ‘fixes’ it for him as either a correct application of the rule or not; and 
such interpreting of the rule by the pupil is nothing less than his imitating his teacher, since the 
teacher is the rule for him.  But if the pupil already understands the rule through expertise, he 
proceeds simply by acting on his expertise and this requires no mediation on his part, that is, he 
no longer requires the presence of his teacher.  His action is now a manifestation of the rule, of 
his expertise and understanding, that is, of himself, since he has now become the rule.  And so 
it is now from the standpoint of the expert that he is then able to justify his action through 
explanations and rule-formulations, as further evidence of his expertise.   
   On the community view of rule-following, the perspective of the novice rule-follower, that 
is to say, the perspective involving interpretations of a rule, is used to argue for the necessity of 
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other rule-followers who act as the measure for this novice rule-follower; it is an argument for 
the perspective involving the manifestation of the rule in an action; this community view 
emphasizes the conclusion Wittgenstein reached in PI 201 in the so-called ‘paradox of 
interpretation’, namely, that its solution requires that there be others to act as a standard by 
which we can determine whether any given application of a rule is actually in accord with the 
rule, through what “we call ‘obeying a rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases”3.  Of course, 
there is in fact a genuine problem of interpretation when it comes to following a rule.  But what 
the community view fails to see, however, is that one who has attained ‘mastery of a 
technique’, an expert in his field, has already ‘solved’ the problem of interpretation as it relates 
to the problem of the novice rule-follower, and his independence is actually founded on the 
overcoming of this ‘paradox’.  As long as one still requires others in order to be said to follow 
a rule, one can never really be an expert or have mastery, but must act as one who follows an 
order, dependent on another for the determination of correctness: one is continually a pupil, or 
the slave to another’s rule—you might say that here one never arrives at the rule, that is, one 
never becomes the rule.  And so the ‘paradox of interpretation’ is really only a problem for the 
pupil who is learning to follow the rule, a problem that is easily solved by his learning the rule.  
The conclusion of PI 201, by presupposing a rule to be followed, and hence something that can 
be interpreted, presupposes the teacher or expert rule-follower at the same time, since the 
teacher or expert really is the ‘rule’ which the pupil then imitates or ‘interprets’: this is hardly a 
conclusive argument for the necessity of a social community for rule-following to exist; the 
argument of PI 201 merely reduces to saying that for a rule to be interpreted, it must already 
actually exist, that is, there must already be a rule-follower, someone other than the 
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interpreter—but since there need be no interpretations for the teacher, there need be no other 
rule-followers except that rule-follower: rule-follower and rule are now one and the same.   
     If the rule of the expert, that is, the expert qua expert, is the rule itself, then rules can act 
at a distance, as teacher is to pupil.   There can be an intermediary acting between a rule (the 
teacher) and its application (the teacher’s action), because the rule is really just a human being 
and this human being’s action can be imitated by the pupil, and hence interpreted.  Thus the 
pupil is this intermediary, since he is the one who acts by imitating his teacher, making his 
action also the teacher’s action; we can say this, only because the purpose of the action is still 
with the teacher and not yet with the pupil.   
  The rule-formulation or sign, however, confuses our understanding of the relation between 
the rule and its application, because this sign can also be interpreted.  But this sign can be 
interpreted by any action, because it can be made to have any use, and its purpose will always 
reside outside itself and in the one who made this sign. The genuine problem of interpretation, 
however, arises from and is then solved in the relation between teacher and pupil, when the 
pupil finally grasps the purpose of the rule and unites his action to it; his action is no longer his 
teacher’s, but now his own.  The use of a rule-formulation is not a necessary part of this 
transformation, only an ancillary part.  What is often called the ‘internal relation’ between a 
rule and its application is just a definition or stipulation otherwise called ‘the sign’; but the 
‘internal relation’ between a rule and its application in the pliant picture of the rule is a 
genealogical relation, that is to say, it is the unity of the rule-follower’s action with its purpose, 
and this unity comes to be through the pupil’s imitation of his teacher, that is, through the 
external relation between teacher and pupil that is only now truly called ‘compliance with a 
rule’.  This is why I stated earlier that the essence of rule-following is the genealogical 
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transformation, through the imitation of action, of the difference between rule (teacher qua 
purpose) and rule-follower (pupil qua action) into the self-identity of the rule-follower (the 
pupil qua action) with the rule (himself qua purpose).   By having the rule-follower become the 
rule, an internal or self-relation is forged within the rule-follower himself.      
      Since the rule-follower really is the rule, then, the rule-follower cannot be said to follow the 
rule blindly.  The picture drawn here is entirely different from that of Wittgenstein; hence no 
qualifier is necessary to characterize how he follows the rule, blindly or otherwise, for if he 
follows the rule at all, he already is the rule.  There is no question or answer concerning how he 
is able to follow it, except by saying perhaps: “he already learnt it.”  For Wittgenstein, 
however, there is still a difference between rule and rule-follower, and so the rule cannot be so 
easily dispensed with, even if it turns out to be useless for guiding the rule-follower when he 
follows the rule.  That is why the expression ‘following the rule blindly’ is paradoxical in his 
case but still necessary, since the expression is also saying that this rule is both there and not 
there: what is there to follow, a rule-formulation or sign, is useless to guide the rule-follower 
further, and so the rule that is not there—the so-called ‘extension’ of the rule qua sign—is what 
he ends up following—blindly.  (And what better way is there to follow a rule that is not there 
than to follow it blindly!)  Despite the fact that this rule he is following is not really there, the 
rule-follower somehow still follows the rule; the rule-follower in fact now follows the rule 
because he has been trained in a certain way, that is, he has been conditioned to do so.  For 
Wittgenstein, the rule as handrail still works because its missing extension has been reduced to 
the conditioning of the rule-follower; in this conditioning, or ‘training’, he is able to preserve 
the rule that is different from the rule-follower, even though he now had to think of rule and 
rule-follower abstractly in order to maintain this difference.  This was easy enough—he then 
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simply restated these conditions once again in the form of the sign, although this time the sign 
was not the standard rule-formulation the rule-follower said he followed, but the sign that fell 
under our description of his training to ‘follow the rule’.  The connection here is not just 
‘causal’ but also ‘grammatical’.  Wittgenstein could not get rid of this abstract rule—the sign 
itself—and hence the abstract difference between rule and rule-follower, since this difference 
lay at the heart of his picture of the rule.   
 
1.3 Following a Rule is not Analogous to Obeying an Order 
 
     Because Wittgenstein could not get rid of the abstract rule that is followed blindly, his 
notion of ‘mastery of a technique’ seems in the end to be a limited form of mastery, something 
closer to what you would expect from a skilled servant who has been dutifully trained: the rule-
follower, after all, is said to act blindly (PI 219) and as a matter of course (PI 238)6.  In fact, his 
reasons for acting will soon give out, and so he just acts, without reasons (PI 211)7, just as he is 
inclined to say, when all his justifications have been exhausted, “This is simply what I do” (PI 
217)8.  Moreover, his thinking he is following a rule cannot be the same as his following a rule; 
thus he cannot follow a rule ‘privately’ (PI 202), that is, independently of others9.  One would 
think that with such a characterization of the rule-follower, the rule has no useful role to play in 
rule-following apart from its formulation, but one would be wrong.  The rule is still there, but it 
is there like an order given from a superior: the tendency is to see the rule as though it were 
analogous to an order (PI 206)10.  The rule imposes itself on the rule-follower just as someone 
who gives an order imposes the order on its obeyer.  The rule, like an order from a superior, 
requires compliance from a rule-follower who is passive by nature. 
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   This last criticism of Wittgenstein’s view of rule-following is not based on an isolated 
passage, but on a pattern of expressions used to characterize rule-following that connect with 
how he views the nature of the rule itself.  At RFM V.32, for example, he says 
straightforwardly that “the rule conducts you like a gangway with rigid walls….Here is the 
rule, like an order!  And like an order in its effect.”11   He is no doubt expressing a similar view 
in PI 212, when he says: “When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue the 
series, I act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons does not trouble me.”  In 
fact, to speak of following ‘blindly’ and as a ‘matter of course’ is closer to the language of 
obeying an order than that of following a rule, since this language is compatible with acting 
without purpose.  Yet the significant difference between following a rule and obeying an order 
is that in obeying an order, we need give no thought to the purpose of the order—that belongs 
to whomever gave the order—our purpose is merely to follow it, that is, to carry out the order.  
But following a rule should not be characterized in the language of obeying an order, otherwise 
we merely focus on the mere act and do not see the rule’s connection to its purpose.  The 
action in following a rule, like that in obeying an order, becomes an end in itself.  In order to 
establish the meaning of this mere action, then, requires some form of compliance with 
another.  Seeing rule-following as analogous to obeying an order thus re-enforces the picture of 
compliance. 
     Following a rule is not analogous to obeying an order in this respect: an order is given to 
someone by someone else; thus the action which is the execution of the order is both initiated 
and then completed, that is, judged, by someone other than the one carrying out the order, even 
if the one carrying out the order knows what counts as fulfilling the order (the servant must 
know, after all, what pleases his master).  Such an action is closer to that of the pupil who 
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understands the rule well enough to follow it, but still requires the teacher both to set him upon 
his appointed task and confirm for him that he has completed this task.  Thus the primary 
objection to any analogy between following a rule and obeying an order is that the difference 
here is between independence and dependence of action.  For the rule-follower, the beginning 
and end of the action is with himself; for the order-obeyer, the beginning and end of the action 
is with another, that is, with the one who gives the order.  Characterizing rule-following as 
analogous to order-obeying is a misleading step towards picturing the rule as an order, and so 
as something which is independent of the rule-follower and with which he must comply.  
Indeed, when Wittgenstein makes this analogy explicitly in PI 206, it is an analogy based on 
our training to follow a rule and obey an order; and we fail to see that this training masks the 
significant difference between the two, because training to follow a rule is a training for 
independence, whereas training to obey an order is a training for dependence or subordination 
to another.  Training is in fact the only true form of compliance in rule-following. 
     The objection to this analogy, therefore, is no mere quibble, since the analogy lends support 
to the idea that rule and rule-follower must be different from one another, just as the one giving 
an order is different from the one who is ordered to obey it.  Thus this analogy in large part 
reinforces the compliant picture of the rule, giving rise to the paradox of compliance.  Seeing 
rule-following as analogous to obeying an order only obscures what is essential in rule-
following, namely, the phenomenon of imitation of action.  Obeying an order presupposes rule-
following skills as does giving orders, since giving orders and obeying them are just rule-
following capacities distributed among more than one individual.  If there is any instructive 
analogy here at all, obeying an order is analogous to one stage of following a rule—the pupil’s 
imitation of his teacher.  And this analogy can now be given weight through the fact that when 
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one learns to follow a rule, we do have here a case in which rule-following capacities are being 
exercised and formed through the interaction of two individuals, one independent (the teacher 
or parent), the other dependent (the pupil or child).  And it is in such a case that we most 
naturally see ‘orders being given’ and ‘orders being obeyed’.  But the asymmetry found in the 
relationship between teacher and pupil is not fixed or permanent but transitional for the pupil, 
and for this reason, rule-following is prior to order-obeying as whole is to part, since rule-
following forms the whole phenomenon of which order-obeying is only a part or stage.  In 
other words, compliance in rule-following is not the goal of the pupil’s training to follow a 
rule, it is his training—and this training eventually comes to an end. 
 
 
 
Notes to Chapter 1: 
1. PI 50: “…There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is 
not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.—But this is, of course, not to ascribe 
any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of 
measuring with a metre-rule….” 
 
2. cf. PI 219: “‘All the steps are really already taken’ means: I no longer have any choice.  The rule, 
once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through 
the whole of space.—But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help? 
     No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically.—I should have 
said: This is how it strikes me. 
     When I obey a rule, I do not choose. 
     I obey the rule blindly.” 
The last sentence in this section—“I obey the rule blindly”—has been interpreted variously by 
different commentators.  Baker and Hacker, for example, understand ‘blindly’ as synonymous with 
‘with certitude’ or ‘complete confidence’; Kripke understands it as synonymous with 
‘unhesitatingly’.  The context here certainly links ‘blindly’ to a lack of choice in how to proceed 
when following a rule; hence other commentators, like Williams and Medina, see here some form 
of ‘alternative-blindness’; thus they characterize following a rule as analogous in some sense to 
‘blind obedience’, even though Anscombe’s translation of folgen as ‘obey’ is misleading at best 
(‘obey’ is usually the translation of befolgen, not folgen).  But the choice of ‘blindly’ (blind) as a 
word that can also be used to capture all these various senses—confidently, unhesitatingly, 
unquestioningly, as a matter of course—is symptomatic, I claim, of Wittgenstein’s tendency to see 
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rule-following as closely analogous to order-obeying.  After all, one also obeys an order from a 
superior unhesitatingly and unquestioningly, that is, with blind obedience; and although there is 
some overlap between the two, there is a significant difference between obeying an order and 
following a rule.  I only wish to point out here that these same ways of characterizing rule-
following are in fact incompatible with an account of rule-following that is distinguished from 
order-obeying. 
     It could be argued that it is significant that Wittgenstein chose the word ‘blindly’ instead of 
others like ‘unhesitatingly’ or ‘unquestioningly’, because ‘blindly’ is a word that connotes a lack of 
vision, and so it is somewhat paradoxical for him to characterize rule-following, an activity that 
manifests understanding or knowledge, with the lack of it (‘seeing’ is often a synonym for 
‘understanding’ or ‘knowing’; indeed, acting ‘as a matter of course’ (selbstverständlich) would 
seem to underscore such understanding by making what must be done ‘self-evident’).  This 
paradoxical way of putting things in PI 219 is of a piece with his explicitly paradoxical language in 
RFM-V.46 that compares a rule with a short bit of handrail acting as a guide, beyond which “there 
is nothing there; but there isn’t nothing there!”  Indeed, part of my overall argument is that 
Wittgenstein never really solved this paradox, although he was aware of its existence—it could also 
be called the ‘paradox of compliance’—and so the metaphor of acting ‘blindly’ fits his exposition 
well; this paradox may very well also explain why he chose to see rule-following as closely 
analogous to order-obeying, since order-obeying also has the aspect of ‘blindness’ to it in the sense 
of ‘blind obedience’.   
     Order-obeying does seem to have this one thing going for it, however, in relation to rule-
following using signs—in using these signs, one pays no attention to the consequences of using 
them, that is, their use by the sign-user has no consequences other than their being used in a certain 
way (a use which also shows at the same time the autonomy of the sign).  And so, in this sense of 
‘blind’, we are indeed ‘blind’ to any consequences we may feel coincides with their use, since it is 
not up to the order-obeyer to determine the purpose of the order—that is determined by the order-
giver—he, the order-obeyer, is simply to carry out the order, to follow the order ‘blindly’.  For him, 
the order has no purpose other than its mere execution; he expects no reward other than a job well 
done; yet the order-obeyer, like the sign, still is and must be for another.  This peculiarity of rule-
following involving signs is explored more extensively in the discussion of the use and usefulness 
of the sign in Chapter 3. 
 
3. PI 201: “This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.  The answer was: if everything can be 
made out to accord with the rule, then it can be made out to conflict with it.  And so there would be 
neither accord nor conflict here. 
     It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our 
argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, 
until we thought of yet another standing behind it.  What this shews is that there is a way of 
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the 
rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases. 
     Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation.  But 
we ought to restrict the term ‘interpretation’ to the substitution of one expression of the rule for 
another.” 
 
4. PI 211: “How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself—whatever instruction you 
give him?—Well, how do I know?—If that means ‘Have I reasons?’ the answer is: my reasons will 
soon give out.  And then I shall act, without reasons.”   
 
5. In mathematics, as with all rule-governed activities employing signs, the ‘why’ does not dictate 
the ‘how’ as clearly as it does in baking, for example.  A mixing bowl has a ‘why’, that is, a 
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purpose or function, and a ‘how’, which is the proper way in which it is used that fulfills that 
function.  But there is also another ‘how’ for the mixing bowl, and this ‘how’ is the way in which it 
is manufactured.  The ‘how’ in mathematics (e.g. the operation of addition) would be like this latter 
‘how’ of the mixing bowl; it is independent from the other ‘how’ that fulfills a practical purpose, 
and so this ‘how’ is also autonomous in an important sense, because there are really two activities, 
as it were, going on at the same time: the activity that is the use of a sign (including, importantly, its 
past usage), and the activity which is the use for using such signs.  The latter use constitutes the 
usefulness of signs.  Thus it may appear as though mathematics needs no ‘why’ in order for it to be 
mathematics; or put in another way, the normativity in mathematics is not directly based on the fact 
that mathematics “has been found to pay”.  But the ‘why’ of mathematics does not determine 
normativity in mathematics in that way.  In the case of the mixing bowl, the material out of which it 
is made could be said to be its normative basis, since the ideal material will allow it to retain its 
proper shape so that it can continue to function as it should.  Normativity in mathematics likewise 
retains the proper ‘shape’ of mathematics, such that mathematics can still function in the practical 
way it does for us, and the activity which retains the proper ‘shape’ of mathematics, its normative 
activity, is independent from whatever activity that then uses mathematics for its own purposes, 
which may be many.  In short, signs are tools, or rather, the use or employment of signs is itself a 
tool, and unlike a mixing bowl, which has more or less a single purpose and whose shape can only 
be maintained by a finite number of media, mathematics is not limited to a single purpose, nor is it 
limited by its medium (its physical medium is ‘pen and paper’, but its functioning media are the 
‘uses’ of signs). 
     This duality of use and usefulness with respect to rules involving signs is why the meaning of 
rules involving signs must be overdetermined.  (The physical media of sign-usage, whether ink on 
paper or vocal sounds, cannot dictate usage or purpose with respect to signs: that is why signs exist 
at a higher level of abstraction, that is, of arbitrariness and autonomy, than artifacts like mixing 
bowls; sign-usage is in effect part of the ‘material’ medium of the sign, like the hardness or softness 
of the material of a mixing bowl made of, respectively, steel or plastic.  Think here of the 
‘hardness’ of the logical or mathematical ‘must’; think also of Wittgenstein’s talk about the 
‘inexorability’ of mathematics.)  I discuss this further in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
 
6. PI 238: “The rule can only seem to me to produce all its consequences in advance if I draw them 
as a matter of course.  As much as it is a matter of course for me to call this colour ‘blue’. (Criteria 
for the fact that something is a ‘matter of course’ for me.)” 
 
7. PI 211: “How can he know he is to continue a pattern by himself—whatever instruction I give 
him?—Well, how do I know?—If that means ‘Have I reasons’ the answer is: my reasons will soon 
give out.  And then I shall act, without reasons.” 
 
8. PI 217: “‘How am I able to obey a rule?’—if this is no a question about causes, then it is about 
my justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
     If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.  Then I am 
inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’ 
     (Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their 
form.  Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping 
supporting nothing.)” 
 
9. PI 202: “And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.  And to think one is obeying a rule is not 
to obey a rule.  Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was 
obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.” 
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10. PI 206: “Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order.  We are trained to do so; we react to 
an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the 
order and the training?  Which one is right? 
     Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you.  
In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed 
them, rebelled against them, and so on? 
     The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret 
an unknown language.” 
 
11. RFM-V.32: “But I mean: the rule conducts you like a gangway with rigid walls.  But against 
this one can surely object that the rule could be interpreted in all sorts of ways.—Here is the rule, 
like an order!  And like an order too in its effect.” 
 
12. Zettel 320: “Why don’t I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of 
grammar arbitrary?  Because ‘cookery’ is defined by its end, whereas ‘speaking’ is not.  That is 
why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not.  You 
cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow 
other rules than those of chess you are playing another game; and if you follow grammatical rules 
other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking 
of something else.” 
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Chapter Two: The Relation between Teacher and Pupil 
 
 
2.1 The Relation between Teacher and Pupil is a Natural Extension of that between 
Parent and Child 
 
 
  Some may ask, like Bloor, where experts derive their authority, if not from the consensus of 
the community?1  But experts are not experts merely in virtue of being chosen, they are experts 
in virtue of who they are and what they do in relation to others.  They do not in fact derive their 
status as experts from the community, but derive it analogously, in relation to the non-expert, 
from the natural relation which exists between parent and offspring: it is an asymmetric 
relation of dependence.  The teacher, who is an expert in a certain relation to another, namely, 
the pupil, is an extension of this natural relation found throughout the animal world (the parent-
offspring relation in animals).  As long as the child is dependent on the parent and takes the 
parent to be its authority and provider, the relation will exist and continue to exist, although it 
will not exist indefinitely.  But an adult is not dependent on the community in the same way; 
the community is not a parent, and can bestow authority to an individual only in an abstract 
sense, as is the case where individuals by convention elect one of their own to make unilateral 
decisions for them all; this conventional kind of authority is arbitrary and does not thereby 
abolish the authority of those who elect and choose to defer such authority to another of their 
kind.  Authority remains with each of them; and the elected has his abstract authority only on 
this basis: he cannot strip them of such authority, but they can strip him of his, because they are 
all peers equally and on a par with the elected, like those who have mastery of a technique.  
Here the relationship between the elected and the electors is freely chosen and arbitrary, in the 
sense that anyone of them could now refuse to follow the elected and still have mastery of a 
technique.  In fact, the relationship among peers is reciprocal; techniques can be exchanged or 
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improved, whereas this is not true of the relation between parent and child: a child will learn a 
technique in the way the parent practices it (for example, language), even if it is thought to be 
deficient from another’s perspective.  For another adult here to correct the parent or to teach 
otherwise would only confuse the child, not necessarily improve his technique.  This shows 
that the parent has a unique status for the child, a status which is not acknowledged among 
other adults.  And eventually, too, the parent will lose this status for the child as the child 
grows and becomes independent, that is, another adult. 
The difference between a young child and a mature adult using a language is that if a young 
child is reprimanded for mistakes, he usually is incapable of disputing with an accomplished 
language-user whether he is in fact following a rule of language or not; young children are 
dependent on adults, and so do not ordinarily question their authority.  Only with time will they 
become independent and capable of defending themselves.  One of the first ways that they do 
become independent is by quickly becoming competent language users; they learn language far 
earlier than they learn other activities, because language itself becomes a necessary tool for 
learning more sophisticated human activities, like taking up the subjects taught in school, 
reading and writing, learning skills essential to trades and professions, and so on.  Mature 
adults, however, can also correct one another in matters of language, correcting pronunciation, 
syntax, the failure to distinguish one word from another; but these corrections are not on the 
same level as between parent and child.  For adults, a standardized language represents an 
idealized form of the language with which all are thought to comply, but exceptions or 
variations are permitted in a way that they are not for children learning a language, even if 
some of the ‘mistakes’ children make are similar or the same as an adult would make.  As 
adults, we tolerate things other adults do, despite the fact we believe they are wrong or 
 35
mistaken.  We are justifiably less tolerant with children, because we feel we have the right to 
teach them as we feel fit, that is, they should do things as we do them. 
When children learn to speak, for instance, their speaking is largely hit and miss, and it is 
our responses of understanding and not understanding which is corrective for them in a 
practical sense, that is, through trial and error they learn how to speak more effectively with us.   
What shows us that children do not merely learn passively from us by accepting our reactions 
and corrections as beyond questioning is the fact that they also try to justify their actions, that 
is, manipulate us, by the same speech we have taught them, since justifying one’s action in 
rule-following is a different skill than the skill one is justifying.  Manipulation is clear evidence 
here of awareness of the power of the sign and the accessibility that the sign provides one to 
the world at large.  The child, as it matures into a competent language-user, no longer feeds off 
the reactions of the adult in the helpless way in which an infant is suckled by its mother.  The 
reactions of the adult are important and will remain so for the length of the child’s education, 
but there is a weaning process in this relation, because the interaction between parent and child 
is not completely asymmetric but becomes one which itself primes the child for adult 
interaction and all the ways in which adults must learn to live with one another, and this 
invariably involves mutual respect as well as surreptitious manipulation: the use of a thing for 
one’s own self-interest separately from the interests of another without this being transparent to 
the other.  By surreptitious manipulation, the child begins to lessen his dependence on the 
adult, even if he really is still dependent on him and must be; by taking hold of language for 
himself, he no longer is merely given or allowed it at the discretion of another.  In a similar 
way, the master, though dependent materially on the slave and the institution of slavery, can be 
‘free’ of the slave by manipulating him freely and in full transparency, as a tool for his own 
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purposes.  And so, too, for one who has mastery of a technique like language, since the child’s 
ability to give justifications of his action and make similar judgments about another’s marks an 
important turning point in the development of the rule-follower—he can now rationally stand 
his own ground against the critical judgments of others.  This moment therefore marks the end 
of his training to follow a rule, that is, it is the end of his compliance with the rule. 
     Manipulation of others, like imitation of others, comes naturally to human beings, insofar 
as neither is learned.  Indeed, manipulation may just be a form of imitation, if manipulation is 
viewed as a child’s awareness of the difference between what another says and does, and his 
exploiting of this difference by imitating any discrepancy between the two for his own 
advantage.  The child would then really be simply imitating the adult, to the extent that he sees 
the adult’s duplicitous purposes in giving justifications and acting.  Whether a child 
manipulates us on this basis, or whether he does so independently of imitation, does not 
concern us at this point: we simply acknowledge that such manipulation does exist in the child, 
that this marks his growth towards independence from the adult, and that it is itself not part of 
the instruction given by the adult, but a natural development within it.  Such acknowledgement 
has implications for our understanding of normativity: normativity is not something that is 
exclusively found in the relation between parent and child, teacher and pupil—in other words, 
in a so-called ‘social’ relation involving compliance—but something that is, more importantly, 
developing within the child or pupil through a genealogical relation to the parent or teacher, as 
an expression of the child’s or pupil’s independence; the normativity of the rule comes to be 
through grasping the purpose of the rule, through making an activity one’s own activity, that is, 
for oneself.  Normativity is thus the expression of self-determination in the pupil or child. 
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2.2 Imitation of the Teacher and Correction of the Pupil 
 
Before children are trained in language-use by correction, they are pre-trained, as it were, 
by imitating language-users.  Imitation, like play, comes naturally to children, and these are the 
first stages of training in the formal sense.  Children can just as easily imitate the correcting 
behavior of adults, even when they clearly do not know what the correct behavior is.  The first 
sense of a language-game in PI 7, much like a ‘primitive language’, is perhaps like this 
imitating or playing.  Obviously, there is a difference between imitating an activity through 
imagination and actually doing that activity, and it would be premature to call such behavior 
‘rule-following’.  But the importance of imitation in rule-following is that it is something we 
do naturally and is therefore prior to training through correction, indeed to any formal training 
at all: without it, correction itself would lose its usefulness, since the teacher’s correction of the 
pupil’s action does not just prompt the student to make another attempt at following the rule, 
rather the teacher’s example of correcting his own mistakes is itself meant to be imitated by the 
pupil, so that the pupil learns to correct himself just as the teacher corrected himself.  In fact, 
imitation is so essential to learning to follow a rule, that it actually constitutes his training 
properly speaking.  By imitating his teacher, the pupil is already agreeing with him, that is, 
complying with his teacher.  Imitation is thus the true form of compliance in rule-following; 
correction is only necessary when imitation at first fails its purpose, and even then, imitation 
again becomes the only remedy—a second course of action, now involving correction itself. 
How much correction is involved in someone learning a language or any other rule-
governed activity?  Doesn’t imitation, that is, the natural mimicry of the behavior of others, 
count for much more than such corrections?  It must, if someone can learn chess and the rules 
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of chess from merely watching others play it, as Wittgenstein noted in PI 31.  Correction would 
play no part, unless he were also to observe others being corrected during play; at any rate, his 
observations and later attempts at imitating the playing of chess can get one so far as to be 
considered in some sense the master of a game.  What underlies and sometimes belies the 
corrections given by others is their actual behavior, which may or may not be consistent with 
such corrections, especially when these corrections come in the form of the sign, as judgments 
of rule-following behaviour.  People do, after all, correct others for faults which they 
themselves routinely commit.  Corrections of this sort are like the adage ‘do as I say, not as I 
do’, and can impede the learning of the pupil, but not necessarily for long.  Pupils, like 
children, can determine for themselves whether teachers are consistent in what they say and do.  
We say that a pupil or child has matured when he can achieve the stance of a critic himself and 
judge his teacher.  And often pupils and children actually ignore the instructions and 
corrections of others, if they determine for themselves that there is such a gap between what is 
said and done; in these cases, what the teacher does will trump what he says.  The pupil will 
simply act in the way he sees his teacher to act, and this is really just to imitate him.  Imitation 
comes naturally to human beings, and is itself something not taught by another.  
     What really holds rule-following together is not simply acts of correction by other rule-
followers, even teachers, but acts of imitation; and these acts will only bear fruit once the point 
of these actions has also been grasped, since to grasp the purpose of the rule is itself the 
purpose of the training, that is, the purpose of the imitation of the teacher’s actions.  We 
overestimate the importance of instruction and correction in learning to follow the rule, 
because we see such learning as essentially passive and not active; instruction and correction 
are necessary for the pupil to learn how to follow the rule blindly, that is, he needs the proper 
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conditioning brought about by instruction and correction.  The pupil must be moulded into a 
certain shape by the teacher against his own inclinations.  
We must be wary, however, of attributing to the teacher in teaching the rule to the pupil a 
responsibility which does not really belong to him; that is to say, it can be enough that the 
teacher simply be there for the pupil and do what he normally does in following the rule, since 
the teacher primarily functions as the rule for the pupil to follow; he does not ‘mould’ the pupil 
into a rule-follower, although it may look that way in the case of a slow learner who needs 
constant correction.  Jose Medina’s account of Wittgenstein’s view of the matter is 
unfortunately that of the teacher drilling or inculcating into the pupil the proper ‘behavioral 
regularities’ along with a ‘normative attitude’ towards these behaviours (165); and the pupil is 
merely submissive to this drilling; indeed, he has a submissiveness characterized as ‘blind 
obedience’ to his ‘master’ (163)2.  In addition, the training of the pupil is meant to produce in 
him the illusion that this training is irrelevant in following the rule (167).  But such a 
characterization of learning is too forced: it is as though learning to follow a rule were a form 
of brainwashing, and the teacher’s responsibility were to make the pupil into a blind follower, 
into a work of his own hands, like a living sculpture.  On the contrary, the teacher at first needs 
to stimulate the pupil’s natural interest in learning the rule, so that he wants to be like his 
teacher; and the teacher does this by showing the pupil the purpose or point of the rule, what 
he can do with it.  This is why the pupil needs to be exposed to the purpose of the rule as early 
as possible, since it is what needs to be grasped most of all and is that for the sake of which the 
rule even exists; and by grasping this purpose as firmly as possible, the pupil will know that it 
could have been grasped differently, or perhaps, through some innovation, in a better way—but 
there is no illusion produced here, no brainwashing.  (The pupil’s grasping of the purpose of 
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the rule is his ‘normative attitude’ and not something ‘inculcated’ by his teacher separately 
from his actions.)  The teacher’s instruction and correction of the pupil are important, of 
course, but these are not the foundation of his teaching; the teacher’s fundamental role is better 
thought of as passive and the pupil’s as active, not the reverse, since the pupil is the one who is 
becoming what his teacher already is, and he can only do this if he takes the initiative by 
imitating another’s actions.  The teacher is really just activating by his presence and 
encouragement the innate capacity of the pupil to follow him, since his pupil is also a human 
being like himself, a living being having its own independence by nature, not a lifeless clump 
of clay.   
We think erroneously that if we only had the correct instruction to give the pupil, he would 
learn to follow the rule correctly, but it is his natural ability to follow his teacher that will 
determine that more than any instruction or correction given: the child can learn language just 
as well by listening to others speak.  It looks as though we had to drill this instruction into the 
pupil, because we often feel we have to do that in the case of someone who has little or no 
natural aptitude for what we are teaching, even though this drilling may often be in vain or 
counterproductive.  One could say this perhaps about teaching and learning: the teacher must 
not look down on his pupil in teaching, rather the pupil must look up to his teacher in learning. 
 
2.3 Agreement between Teacher and Pupil; Two Different Forms of Community 
 
‘Rule’ and ‘agreement’ are closely related concepts only with respect to the pupil who is 
learning the rule.  But for the rule-follower, agreement with others no longer really applies, nor 
does ‘rule-following’ literally speaking.  What is important for the rule-follower, though, is 
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consistency of procedure and consistency of result.  These are the tests by which we say that 
someone has mastered the art of baking, for example.  We are concerned that the pupil learn 
the rule and be in agreement with his teacher, but here learning the rule and eventually 
mastering it only means that at some point the rule no longer apply to him, that is, the rule of 
the expert, his teacher.  When the pupil himself becomes an expert, he is a practitioner in his 
own right, and his technique comes with its own rule3.  This transformation, from pupil to 
teacher, rule-follower to rule,  leaves open the possibility that the new rule-follower may excel 
even his own teacher, or be innovative in the sense of introducing new rules, or better rules.  
The point here is that anyone who has mastery of a technique is eo ipso a standard by himself, 
someone capable of teaching others his own technique, his own rules.  The rule-follower 
himself has no superiors, only fellow practitioners, his peers, and with them and in agreement 
with them, the rules of baking can be standardized publicly.  But these standardized rules are 
really just secondary rules, abstracted from the practices of rule-followers in the form of rule-
formulations; they are the common expression of the community of experts in their desire to 
stabilize their trade or profession and ensure overall consistency of procedure and product.  
They are like the formal rules of standard English in that no one really observes them strictly in 
everyday discourse, but they serve instead as an instructional aid in general education and as 
the formal way in which the experts themselves communicate with one another. 
     There are, then, two different kinds of rule-following: primary rule-following, namely, 
that which exists between expert and non-expert (teacher and pupil, parent and child) in a 
relation of normativity, and secondary rule-following, that is, that which exists between experts 
as peers (adults, teachers) in a relation of community.  This latter community is what public 
standards are meant to apply to, and these standards merely stabilize a community of 
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practitioners and improve its overall practices, since it essentially involves the production of 
rule-formulations or signs.  Nevertheless, these public standards of the community are 
secondary rules abstracted from its members, the experts (rule-formulations are really just 
secondary rules or abstract rules).  The true source of normativity remains these experts and 
will always be so, because rule-followers are primarily individual human beings and rule-
formulations cannot transcend such individuals and what they do.  The community itself is not 
a rule-follower and cannot be one, no more than humanity is a human being. 
The individual and the community do not exist on a par; only individuals exist on a par: 
the community is made up of such individuals.  The community neither acts nor reacts, and 
consequently cannot be said to make mistakes either.  But this is not to define it as infallible, as 
a standard of normativity, since this concept of community is merely abstract, like the concept 
of humanity.  If the concept of the community is to be meaningful for the concept of rule-
following, it must be thought of as the relation of individuals who are already rule-followers 
themselves; such a community of individuals, if organized formally into professional societies, 
would function as a buffer against arbitrary, sudden, or dangerous change from within these 
societies, as long as individuals deferred to such standards or rule-formulations.  This 
community of peers thus stabilizes and solidifies practices which already exist, hinders but 
does not prevent change, in short, provides an appropriate environment for the attainment of 
common goals.  But the social community’s ability to do all this is measured according to the 
lifespan of individuals and their generations.  It is this lifespan of the individual which sets the 
pace for change allowed for society in general, because we often speak of change in society by 
reference to generations and the gaps which exist between generations.  We freely 
acknowledge that things such as values, standards of normativity, aesthetic tastes, slang, all 
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these change, when they do, between generations, and so they also must achieve stability 
within each generation: this stability is found in the form of the individual, not as part of a 
whole, but as this whole itself.  It is the stability found within generations, that is, within the 
individual as whole, which plays the important part reflected in the concept of community.  
Such a conception of community does not think of the community as just a background or 
context for meaning to be established in our activities, since the individual expert alone 
determines that; it is something now abstracted from the activities of the individual, a 
secondary form of rule-following in which compliance makes sense, as long as there are bodies 
created expressly for the purpose of determining whether members have acted in accordance 
with the formalized rules or standards of their respective society.  Nevertheless, there is no 
normativity here apart from what the individual actually does; normativity is in the 
individual—rather, it is the individual, whatever he does.  That the individual can learn to 
follow rules and in turn teach others, improving his technique through interaction with other 
experts in his field, is what community makes possible; it is essentially a relation among those 
who are peers.  In the social community, these peers submit themselves to formalized standards 
for the sake of agreement or conformity, that is, they become a part of something larger, even 
though these formalized standards mean nothing without their collective submission to 
another’s authority: this is in fact why the slave qua slave is the paradigm social being—he is a 
whole reduced to a part by becoming an instrument for another through submission. 
     Community, then, just is these rule-followers in relation to one another as peers, and it is 
only in a certain kind of relation, namely, the genealogical relation between teacher and pupil, 
that the kind of normativity sought by the community view of rule-following is established.  In 
the most general sense, we can say that it is one generation which teaches the next, forming the 
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unbroken links in a chain; but the links are only formed by shaping the individual segments 
while they are still malleable, according to the shape of the last: once they are cooled and 
hardened, they become solid and set and can themselves be linked to further segments as their 
model.  But the segments are not fused together nor linked randomly; they are indeed separate 
and individual, but not separate as isolated pieces, only physically separate as interlinked 
pieces; in this linked form of independent pieces resides the strength and flexibility of the 
chain.  But the last segment is in a sense the most free of them all, because it is still able to be 
linked to something yet undetermined, and only it is able to determine that by its own 
particular shape.  For this reason we think of the last link as the most important and decisive in 
the chain after the first.  Of course, an individual piece is conceivable apart from a segment 
linked to a chain, but the shape of that piece could be almost anything then, and should it have 
the shape of a linked segment, the shape would nevertheless be no more significant than any 
other shape, because here its shape does not have the same role as a linked segment, unless it 
were somehow the beginning of a new chain.  The community thus conceived is a genealogical 
community and not a social one, and the difference between the two consists in this important 
distinction: the social community is a community of parts in which the community itself 
functions as the whole through a form of abstraction in which the individual is reduced 
abstractly in society to a part of society, whereas the genealogical community is a community 
of self-generating wholes who are peers.   
     Jose Medina (2002) misunderstands the role of the community in rule-following by making 
the teacher into a representative of the community of practitioners, as though the teacher were 
acting as a mediator of the rule on behalf of a social community in which he is only a part or 
mere function of this community: the teacher is like the depiction of the rule, one who speaks 
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for the community5.  But the teacher does not mediate between the community and the pupil, 
otherwise we have allowed a gap to exist between the rule and its application through a false 
intermediary: the teacher would in essence be giving an interpretation of the rule that still 
needs to be ‘fixed’ by the community.  Yet if the teacher is the rule and nothing comes between 
him and the pupil, the teacher is the only background for the pupil, so to speak, and there is 
nothing behind the teacher, no background behind the background, no ‘community’ acting at a 
distance.  The social community here is a false background, an abstraction.  The true 
background for the pupil is another human being, the teacher or expert in his element.  In these 
cases, when the pupil acts in the presence of the teacher, the pupil becomes the mediator of the 
rule in the sense that the action of the pupil is still done on behalf of the teacher, and this action 
can only be corrected or approved by the teacher, not by the pupil himself.  Here it makes 
sense to call what the pupil does an interpretation of the rule, since the rule is in fact the 
teacher and the rule-follower’s interpretation of the rule is the pupil’s imitation of his teacher.  
Without the teacher present, the pupil would find himself in the paradox of interpretation 
spoken of in PI 201; and just as there must be an actual rule to interpret and not just 
interpretations of a ‘rule’, so there must also be a teacher to imitate and not just imitations of a 
‘teacher’.    
We must take care, therefore, not to misunderstand the role of the word ‘background’ in 
our account of the teacher’s relation to his pupil.  When one speaks loosely of meaning as 
determined always within some background—for example, a background of practices—the 
background is meant to fill in the emptiness of the dead sign or action with some content—the 
context supplied by the background.  But it is easy to think of the teacher as also belonging to 
this wider context (for example, the community); perhaps we even need to bring in the 
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teacher’s teacher, too, or something else in which to put the teacher himself in context.  We can 
widen this background as much as we like, however, and attribute all kinds of additional things 
to this context without really adding any depth to our account, since we are merely connecting 
one thing to another in our description of this context by simply forming an extended rule-
formulation or sign.  We must think of the teacher, therefore, not as a part of this background 
but as this background itself or, better still, as what determines this background, despite the 
temptation to find the community as this background; after all, we think, isn’t the teacher a part 
of the community?   
Unfortunately, thinking of the social community, or ‘community agreement’, as the 
‘background’ trivializes, indeed dismisses, the one who actually establishes meaning, namely, 
the human being qua expert, the individual, or the one who acts.  It is always admitted, of 
course, that the rule-follower must act (e.g., act blindly, without reasons, from inclinations 
arising from training, etc.), but the rule-follower really becomes absorbed entirely into this 
background and can safely be ignored other than for his mere utility as an agent of the 
background, someone who simply acts in a certain way in a certain context because he has 
been trained by his community to do so; and we think not just of the pupil in this way but of his 
teacher, too.  We have essentially turned the rule-follower into an abstraction, someone who 
exists only in a context, and that means, he is reduced to the description we give of him.  We 
need not ever appeal to the pupil or the teacher for his reasons or justification or even his 
expertise, since they have now become irrelevant to our understanding of these actions.  The 
background will tell us—it is the last court of appeal—whatever that background turns out to 
be in our descriptions.  But we forget that it is the rule-follower who first acts in this context, 
against this background, in these circumstances, just as it is the language-user who first puts 
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this word in this context, against this background, in these circumstances.  But the particular 
background of this action, and hence this meaning, is then really determined by the rule-
follower alone, since the rule-follower, as said earlier, is the one who has mastered his 
surroundings, and such mastery—this putting things in their proper place and context—is what 
actually constitutes his mastery of a technique.  When the rule-follower has gained mastery of 
all these circumstances, and hence mastery of the ‘background’, only then can we say that his 
actions have a particular meaning and belong to a certain ‘context’.  Not only this action, then, 
but this background, too, is determined or given meaning by the rule-follower—there only is a 
background to speak of here because there is a rule-follower here4.  Background and action are 
thus linked together only through the rule-follower as two sides of a coin: hence the 
‘background’, ‘context’, ‘circumstances’ of the rule-follower and his actions are not something 
into which the rule-follower and his actions are placed and that exist as preconditions for him 
acting meaningfully; on the contrary, the rule-follower’s doing this or that is his putting a 
‘context’, and thus a meaning, around what he does.   What are called ‘preconditions’ here are 
simply reformulations of the rule as an extended rule-formulation; such ‘preconditions’ merely 
point to the conditioning of the rule-follower. 
My ‘Kantian maneuver’ in rule-following therefore consists in this insight: the rule-
follower and his action are not given a meaning by a context, a context is rather given a 
meaning by the rule-follower and his action, since this context really exists only in the form of 
a description of what the rule-follower is doing when he follows the rule, and the rule-follower 
himself justifies his own action by giving such a description, even though he need not give a 
justification, that is, a description, at all.  The ‘context’, the ‘background’, the 
‘circumstances’—these are all superfluous, unnecessary in rule-following, like the sign itself, 
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since they exist only in the sign and nowhere else; they are just another manifestation of the 
rule-follower’s expertise—of his being the rule himself.  Only the context given in a 
description of an action will pick out the essential from the inessential in rule-following, and so 
this context merely formulates the rule in an expanded but identical form of the rule—and this 
is in fact the only difference between a simple rule-formulation and a context: a context is just 
a wider description of rule-following, not something deeper.  The community view erroneously 
thinks that the criteria we as describers use to describe the teacher and the pupil in following 
the rule constitute the true background of both, but we earlier saw that this unassuming 
transposition of our ‘background’ onto the teacher and pupil merely expressed our expertise or 
‘mastery of a technique’ and thereby failed to acknowledge the independence and mastery, not 
only of the teacher, but of the pupil, too, even after the pupil was said to have learned the rule 
from his teacher.  The individual, whether teacher or pupil, is looked at as only part of a whole, 
that is, as part of a wider ‘context’, something that, by itself, is isolated and private; but if the 
individual is the only one who can define this ‘context’, both through wielding signs and 
performing actions, then the individual is this whole.  The individual only becomes a part of 
the whole through abstraction, like the slave qua slave, who is merely a part of his master.  
Consequently, to see both teacher and pupil as part of a larger background or context—
‘community agreement’ in the community view—is to maintain the distance, and hence the 
difference, between rule and rule-follower, and this is the cardinal mistake of the community 
view of rule-following. 
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Notes for Chapter 2: 
1. “Someone is correctly called an authority because everyone else calls them this” (Bloor, 31). 
 
2. “An indispensable condition of initiate learning is that the novice have a receptive attitude, 
that is, that she accept the authority of the teacher blindly: ‘Can the pupil contradict and say: 
“How do you know that?” […] Well, we do not assume that the pupil can say that’ (RFM 
VII.26).  In fact, we assume that the novice’s attitude will be that of total submission to the 
authority of the master, of blind obedience to her commands.  For, without passive 
collaboration of the novice, the learning process cannot take place. […] The role of the novice 
in initiate learning is to follow the lead of the master” (163).   
     What Medina fails to appreciate—and Wittgenstein, too—is that the pupil’s following his 
teacher is not really a passive role but an active one: by conforming his actions to that of 
another, he makes himself—that is, becomes—what the other already is.  The relation between 
teacher and pupil is not like the relation between master and slave, but like that between parent 
and child—it is a genealogical relation in which the teacher ‘begets’ the pupil, so to speak, 
since the pupil is the one who transforms himself into a teacher by actively conforming to his 
teacher, that is, by imitating him; and no one teaches him to imitate his teacher—he does this 
on his own.  In fact, the pupil’s inquisitive nature is evidence of his active role in learning to 
follow the rule; he asks probing questions (“How do you know that?”, “Why do you do that?”), 
not because he has a perverse attitude, but because he needs most of all to figure out the 
purpose of the rule he is following and how to achieve it. 
 
3. The pupil’s ‘own rules’ are simply the rule-formulations that he uses to explain or justify or 
describe his own rule, since he is, properly speaking, the rule itself.  Thus, the rule-formulation 
is the self-reflective form of the rule, that is, it is an external expression of the rule-follower’s 
understanding and is not to be conflated with the rule itself. 
 
4. ‘Expertise’ here is not the kind of know-how that is usually the provenance of just the few as 
opposed to the many, or the specially-talented as opposed to the generally unskilled, but simply 
a term used to contrast those who are able do something as opposed to those who have not yet 
learned to do it: thus the language-user would be considered an ‘expert’ if he has attained 
enough mastery of a language to be considered competent to speak, for example, an older 
child.  A baker, on the other hand, is still an ‘expert’ in this sense, too, but the skill that is 
baking is not as versatile or as fundamental as the skill that is speaking, partly because baking 
has more limited ends than language-use, partly because baking, like most other skills, is 
learned after we have acquired our language-skills: hence baking is practiced by fewer human 
beings than language-speaking, since baking is connected to a specific need (e.g. to eat) and 
one baker can fulfill that need for baker and non-baker alike (e.g. others can eat what the baker 
produces and therefore they need not learn to bake in order to eat bakery products).  The term 
‘expert’ is primarily intended, then, as a contrast to ‘non-expert’ in a relation that is paralleled 
in the parent-child relation and the teacher-pupil relation: it is an asymmetric relation of 
dependence.   
     The analogy between language-use and currency-use is fitting, because in both cases, the 
instruments ‘used’ are symbolic in nature and hence gain ‘value’ or ‘meaning’ by being 
accepted as instruments in their respective activities: words are used in language, money is 
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used in commerce.  This acceptance on the part of users is their agreement in using these 
instruments in a certain way in order to ‘purchase’ things of tangible and not merely of 
arbitrary value (e.g. money, which has a certain arbitrary value attached to it by convention, 
can then be used to buy what the baker produces, that is, something that can be eaten and thus 
has intrinsic value for the buyer, just as words can be used to ask him what price are his goods 
and how many of them he wants).  This mutual agreement among language-users and 
currency-users is necessary in these cases for both systems to work as systems of exchange; 
consequently, such agreement is necessary only for the purposes of exchange and not for the 
use of signs.  Thus, in mathematics, if I am to be able to finish your calculations for you, or 
correct them, we must both agree in our usage of our mathematical symbols; but this does not 
mean that we must both agree if I am to finish my own calculations or correct my own errors 
in some arbitrary mathematical system, as though such a system itself required agreement in 
order to be said to be rule-governed.  That you could learn this system, too, does not make 
agreement any more necessary for using this system, unless, of course, you did in fact learn it 
and we both interacted using the same system.  Agreement, therefore, has nothing to do with 
the normativity of rules, unless agreement also plays a part in the usefulness of these rules, as it 
does in language-usage, currency-usage, and our mathematics.   
 
5. Medina (p. 163): “The teacher is invested with a special authority by virtue of her 
competence in the practice at issue.  Her mastery of the rule-following practice makes her a 
representative of the community of rule-followers; and, as such, the teacher has the capacity 
and authority to bring the behavior of the novice into harmony with the behavior of the rule-
following community.  The goal of the training is to bring the pupil into the practice, and this is 
achieved by effecting an ‘agreement in actions’ between the pupil and the teacher (RFM VI.45) 
and hence, by the same token, between the pupil and the community of practitioners.”   
     But why should the goal of the training necessitate effecting an agreement between the 
pupil and the community?  Why not just between the pupil and the teacher?  Indeed, why 
should the goal of the training be to effect an agreement—or a ‘consensus of action’—of any 
kind, as Medina later says on page 165? (“However, the creation of these [conditioned 
behavioral] patterns is only one step toward the ‘consensus of action’ that is the goal of the 
training.”)  Isn’t it enough for the pupil simply to know how to follow the rule, that is, to be 
able to do something with it on his own?  ‘Effecting agreement’ is really just the pupil 
imitating his teacher, and this imitation is just the way in which the pupil becomes like his 
teacher, that is, becomes the rule himself; such ‘agreement’ is not the goal of his training—it is 
his training, since, by imitating his teacher, he already is ‘agreeing’ with him.  But such 
agreement with the community only seems to be the goal of his training because we have the 
teacher acting as the middle term in a relation between the pupil and the community, and so the 
purpose of the teacher being present, and hence the raison d’être of the training, is merely to 
effect this agreement.  It is mistakenly thought that community agreement is a necessary part of 
the rule’s normative nature, since in the community view, normativity requires such agreement 
in the form of compliance with the rule.  Medina’s ‘contextualized’ view of the rule merely 
masks this demand for compliance by making community agreement into a decorative 
background or ‘horizon of understanding’, that is, into something functionally useless in 
determining such compliance for the rule-follower but somehow still necessary for normativity 
to make sense; the ‘context’ merely supplants the compliant rule now in disguised form.  But 
then saying that such agreement, while necessary, only ‘constrains but does not determine what 
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is correct and incorrect’ is like saying that the air surrounding a building does not in fact hold 
up the building as a foundation would; nevertheless, it is necessary to keep the building from 
falling over—after all, no building can exist in a vacuum!  But the purpose of the rule by itself 
establishes the normativity of the rule and is its foundation, while the rule-follower’s grasp of 
this purpose is in fact his ‘normative attitude’ towards it—and this grasping of the rule’s 
purpose, along with the means to achieve it, is also the goal of his training, that is, the goal of 
his imitating his teacher, which ends in his becoming the rule himself.  Community agreement 
determines no part of this, and is thus unnecessary for determining what is correct and 
incorrect in rule-following.  Medina has unwittingly undermined the community view by 
acknowledging that this community cannot determine what is correct or incorrect for the rule-
follower; but he nevertheless supports the compliant picture of the rule by affirming at the 
same time both claims of the paradox of compliance: the community is unnecessary (it does 
not determine normative behaviour), but it isn’t unnecessary (it constrains normative 
behaviour). 
     The problem with Medina’s understanding of the role of the community—his claim that a 
consensus of action only ‘constrains but does not determine’ our normative behaviour—is that 
he only focuses on the rule as guide but ignores the rule as measure.  Yet focusing only on the 
rule as guide leads directly to the problem of interpretation—that is, how am I to know that this 
action is a continuation of the rule that I learned?—and this problem is supposedly solved in PI 
201 by establishing correct and incorrect cases of rule-following using “what we call 
‘following the rule’ and ‘going against it’ from case to case”.  Here normative criteria are fixed 
by what we call ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ cases of rule-following; but if these actions-as-criteria 
are only taken as a guide and not as a measure of rule-following, then Wittgenstein has not 
really solved the problem of interpretation, since we also learned from our teacher through our 
training what are called ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ cases of rule-following.  Yet our training by 
itself cannot overcome the problem of interpretation on Wittgenstein’s account; training alone 
only leads to it, since, even on Medina’s own account, community agreement leaves matters 
‘open-ended’. 
     Paradoxically, Medina says that “the normative standards for the application of a rule are 
exhibited in what we (competent rule followers) regard as ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against 
it’ in actual cases” (178) and that “a regular way of going on….functions as the standard for 
judging the correctness of one’s actions” (177).  But nothing ‘functions as the standard for 
judging the correctness of one’s actions’ without also determining for one what is correct and 
incorrect, and so what ‘we regard’ as correct and incorrect cannot merely constrain us—the 
rule as guide can do that by itself—but must also determine our normative behaviour, that is, 
judge whether we have taken proper guidance from the rule.  That indeed is what a standard 
does—it is an independent measure by which we judge compliance.  Widening the ‘context’ 
only widens this standard—it does not do away with it.  Medina’s incoherent view is actually 
the result of his focusing on the importance of our training and learning, and he draws his 
conclusion thus: “So, on Wittgenstein’s view, the actual practices of ordinary language in 
which we are trained constrain but do not determine our ways of thinking and talking” (187).  
Here, and elsewhere, he explicitly connects his view of community agreement to our training, 
that is, to the rule as guide, not as measure, without realizing that training alone, or 
‘background practices’, provides no help in determining the correctness of our actions within 
the compliant picture of the rule, since the goal of our training, according to Medina’s 
Wittgenstein, is merely to harmonize our action with that of the community’s; and so, for the 
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sake of this compliance, our training can never really come to an end if the community’s 
standards keep changing, and this is just to admit that training alone cannot make the rule-
follower truly independent with genuine ‘mastery of a technique’; moreover, the rule-follower 
cannot then judge his own compliance with the community, no matter what his training, since, 
if he could do that, what further need would he have of the community, except as a false 
crutch?  (Just because the rule-follower is able to say “this is what we call…” doesn’t show his 
compliance either, since he has merely been taught to say such as a justification of his action, 
precisely because there is no independent criterion to which he can directly appeal—there is 
no such ‘we’, no compliant rule, unless this compliant rule is the sign itself, in which case 
‘compliance’ is merely the grammatical projection of a power that the sign does not have; the 
sign, however, is dispensable in rule-following.)  But it would indeed be odd if a teacher could 
only guide us but never measure us, that is, correct us as we tried to follow him; yet this is 
exactly what we are told the ‘indispensable’ role of the community amounts to for us—that it 
can only guide us.  To embrace Medina’s weakened version of the community view, by 
acknowledging the community’s uselessness for determining compliance for the rule-follower, 
while still retaining some use for the community (as a ‘constraining’ guide, that is), is really to 
embrace the paradox of compliance all the more, which is to say, to drive the incoherence of 
the compliant view of the rule even deeper into the morass. 
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Chapter Three: Following a Rule ‘Privately’ 
 
3.1 The Difference between Rule-Following with and without Signs 
 
What is interesting about what Wittgenstein says in PI 201 is not only that there is a way 
of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation but that there need not be any interpretation in 
‘following the rule’, that is, there need be no formal expression of the rule at all, no symbolic 
representation or sign involved in those rule-governed activities whose rules are not the 
employment of symbolic representations or signs.  Baking, for example, can be learned without 
learning or using any symbolic representations, whether in natural language or some other 
system of signs.  Since PI 201 showed that any rule-formulation itself needs to be first fixed to 
some action by an act of definition or stipulation, otherwise the rule-formulation would be 
‘dead’, indeed not even a rule-formulation, what this shows in addition is that the use of a rule-
formulation is itself really just an intermediary action between an action that stipulates its use 
and another such action with which it now agrees.  But the employment of this intermediary 
action or sign can be dispensed with, since rule-following only requires that an action agree 
with another action to maintain its proper ‘shape’, and the rule-formulation here only depicts 
such an action.  With language itself, however, the use of the sign just is the activity called 
‘language’, and the sign cannot therefore be dispensed with qua mere use—only its self-
reflective form can be, that is, the definition we wish to give the sign formally, since this is the 
explicitly abstract form of the sign with which one reflects; but this shows why language itself 
is a poor example with which to generalize about rule-following, since we cannot, as it were, 
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entirely dispense with the sign within language: language, as we said, just is the employment of 
a system of signs. 
In the case of baking, we can see this point more clearly.  No one would say, for example, 
that to know how to use the word ‘baking’ implies that one thereby knows how to bake; yet it 
may be tempting to think, conversely, that to know how to bake implies that one also knows 
what we call ‘baking’, as if an action and the sign that depicts that action somehow amounted 
to the same thing.  The expression “this is what we call ‘baking’” can be used while teaching 
someone how to bake, but it is not necessary; and if it is used here, one is really learning two 
different things at the same time, namely, what is baking and what is called ‘baking’: the one 
need involve no signs (rule-formulations, interpretations) while the other clearly does.  
Obviously, where signs are neither needed nor used to teach a rule-governed activity, the 
problem of interpretation will not arise as it is expressed in PI 201.  It is therefore of 
fundamental importance to distinguish between rule-following with signs and rule-following 
without signs.  In PI 201 and elsewhere, Wittgenstein does not make this distinction; and so 
what needs to be first and foremost defined for us in rule-following, according to Wittgenstein, 
is just the rule-formulation, using an action that ‘we all call such-and-such’.  But when one 
simply does what another does, that is, when one imitates another’s action, nothing is ‘defined’ 
for us by this act, since no sign is involved, but rather an innate, hence unlearned, ability is 
exercised, namely, our natural capacity to imitate another’s action and grasp its purpose.  In the 
classroom we learn language in part this way: we say what the teacher says, we write what the 
teacher writes, and these are the actions we imitate.  If there are any interpretations here, they 
are really just attempts to imitate such actions. 
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In the case of rules involving the use of signs, the rule is overdetermined, as Wittgenstein 
says2 (RFM VI-16), in the sense that the result is a criterion for following the rule and is not 
something to be determined by what follows in experience.  This is why he says that a 
mathematical proposition is not to be treated like an empirical proposition, since the result is 
not something discovered in experience but stipulated through a sign from the beginning.  But 
why must the rule be stipulated from the beginning?  Well, perhaps we ought to say that it 
guarantees the sameness of the result from the sameness of the operation or ‘following the 
rule’.  Baking, for example, gets the same results from the sameness of procedure and 
ingredients, but this result will be determined from certain facts of nature; hence the rules of 
baking are to this extent accountable to reality.  Mathematics, on the other hand, is 
fundamentally different, because its rules are not accountable to reality (or derived from 
reality) in the same way as the rules of baking are.  Its results, which are just more signs, need 
to be stipulated beforehand as what counts as following these rules, as what is the same in 
following these rules.  But how arbitrary are these rules?  What is arbitrary and what is not in 
the sign ‘2 + 3 = 5’?  Well, that will depend in part, of course, on what we do with this sign, on 
how we use this sign in our other activities; but these questions just point us back to an activity 
(not just as stage-setting but as an activity in its own right) that can be done without these 
signs: something quite elementary, no doubt, something like pairing off items, or grouping 
things into sets of three or four, perhaps by row and column.  Could we not say, then, that the 
rules of mathematics are not arbitrary in just this sense: that we could not do what we actually 
do with mathematics if its rules had not been grounded in those simpler activities and later 
defined by them via stipulation?  For we could have stipulated any sign to follow ‘2 + 3 =’, but 
whatever was stipulated in that sign had to make contact with a practice already established 
 56
without stipulation.  And that means that we also learn all the expressions of following the rule 
in a similar way, that is to say, ‘sameness’, ‘agreement’, ‘rule’, etc., presuppose an activity that 
can be done without signs at all, linguistic or otherwise.   
 
3.2 The Use and Usefulness of the Sign: PI 258, PI 260, and PI 270 
 
If we can just imitate the mere use of signs, however, would that by itself give the sign a 
meaning?  After all, it seems that imitation alone cannot be enough—to merely write down a 
sign surely cannot mean anything by itself; there must be something more than just the sign 
qua mere use.  There is in fact more.  When we follow the rules of baking without signs or 
rule-formulations, for example, we don’t ‘use’ any rule-formulations at all, but simply act 
using the equipment of baking.  But with language the sign is used in a certain way and this use 
we identify with the rule itself, and call it ‘the meaning of the sign’.  Such identification may 
also be called the over-determination of the rule, since how we have used the sign has itself 
become a criterion of using the sign correctly, that is, a criterion of what the sign means.  And 
what this means is that the use of the sign now has a function such that this use has a utility, 
like the equipment of baking, in doing something else.  Consequently, when we use a sign, we 
are also doing something else with it.  A sign with a use becomes useful for something other 
than its mere use as a sign.  One might say that the way a sign has been used gives it the shape 
necessary to do something else with it, just as a mixing bowl must first be manufactured into a 
certain shape in order to function the way it needs to in the activity called ‘baking’.  The sign 
‘S’ in PI 258 has a use in the mere sense that when I have a particular sensation, I then write 
‘S’ in my diary1.  But ‘S’ here has no function yet, except perhaps as the name of a sensation, 
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or the noting of its occurrence; and so it really has no meaning, or rather could mean anything, 
since there is yet no answer to the question ‘And what of it?’ 
This contrast between the use and usefulness of the sign may be seen in the orthography 
of English.  The alphabet is a system of signs called ‘letters’ which are supposed to stand for 
sounds in the language.  Consequently, the rules for spelling words in English had the function 
of allowing readers to pronounce the words they read, and so made recognition of these words 
easier, that is, recognition of their spoken form.  But over time, many words changed in 
pronunciation, although the written form did not.  Thus, ‘gh’ in words like ‘laugh’ or ’enough’ 
is pronounced as ‘f’, and in words like ‘ghost’ or ‘ghastly’ is pronounced as ‘g’.  What, then, 
has become of English orthography?  Do the letters of English stand for anything anymore or 
only some do?  Have the rules of some merely changed, or are there no rules at all for these?  
Are we continuing to practice outdated rules, or were these always just pseudo-rules of 
orthography, unconnected to sounds?  Well, there is a connection between letters and sounds in 
English and the written form of many older words have become fossilized, showing how they 
were pronounced at one time but no longer are today; and by continuing to spell these words in 
the same way, we are continuing to follow such rules, even though ‘k’ in ‘knight’ is no longer 
pronounced at all in this language.  The rule for spelling ‘k’ in this case is still used but has lost 
its function as a rule for pronunciation, and so is really phonetically pointless.  The spelling for 
many English words no longer makes sense to us, except in historical context, and so without 
this function, the rule for pronouncing the letter ‘k’ in ‘knight’ has become defunct in modern 
English.  In short, the rule no longer exists as a rule for anything, but the practice of using it 
continues, despite its uselessness for pronunciation.  Here is where use and meaning can come 
apart, that is, where practice and function come apart.  (Think of the vestigial structures of 
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body parts in evolutionary terms).  It is not just how a sign is used, but also for what it is used 
that determines the meaning of a rule in these cases.  And this ‘for what’ or ‘why’ is not of 
secondary importance but foundational for the establishment of the rule. 
The importance of recognizing the use and usefulness of the sign comes out in 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of so-called ‘private ostensive definition’ in PI 258 and beyond.  
This discussion is thought to be related to the question raised in PI 202 concerning the 
possibility of following a rule ‘privately’ and would thus indirectly support the compliant view 
of the rule by making the rule an independent criterion of correctness for the rule-follower.  
But the last sentence of PI 258 shows that the case of the sensation diarist discussed in this 
section is different from the case discussed in PI 202: in PI 258 it makes no sense even to talk 
of ‘right’; in other words, it is not open for discussion whether I am ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in using 
the sign ‘S’.  The lack of a criterion of correctness for using this sign only means that we do 
not yet have the circumstances in which it even makes sense to ask for a criterion of 
correctness.  As PI 260 later informs us, the private diarist is not even making a note of 
anything, since “a note has a function, and this ‘S’ so far has none.” 2  The interlocutor 
responds in PI 258 to the lack of a criterion by saying what his criterion is: “whatever is going 
to seem right to me is right.”  And that response alone presumably shows why using the word 
‘right’ makes no sense.  Wittgenstein’s point seems to be that it is not yet appropriate in these 
circumstances to respond to a lack of a criterion of correctness by looking for one or offering 
one, but rather to see that it makes no sense to look for one or to offer one.  PI 270 will show us 
that once a use is found for ‘S’, it doesn’t in fact matter if one has recognized the connection 
correctly or not, that is, the connection purportedly made in PI 258 between writing the sign 
‘S’ and my memory of associating this sign with the sensation in question.3  Consequently, the 
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attempt in PI 258 to set up a rule or technique for using ‘S’ without the use of ‘S’ itself having 
a use is “mere show”, just as the lack of an independent criterion of correctness for ‘S’ no 
longer actually matters.  
 This case is then obviously different from that in PI 202, since PI 202 shows us more than 
just the uselessness of giving a criterion of correctness for the use of a rule when the rule itself 
has no usefulness—it simply affirms that there must be such an independent criterion of 
correctness in rule-following, without which following the rule would collapse into whatever 
one thinks is following the rule; that is to say, if there is in fact no difference between thinking 
one is following a rule and following a rule, then one may indeed conclude that there is no 
criterion for following a rule other than thinking one is doing so, and this would be the same 
thing as following a rule ‘privately’, since there is now nothing independent of the rule-
follower’s thinking by which one could justify one’s action under the rule (cf. PI 265).  
Consequently, denying the difference between thinking one is following a rule and following a 
rule appears upsetting to us precisely because it makes the rule in rule-following useless for us 
in the compliant sense of the rule, and hence destroys the normativity of the rule.  But that 
consequence alone—the undermining of the compliant picture of the rule—need not compel us 
to affirm this difference, and so seemingly preserve this compliant sense of the rule, since we 
can still deny this difference matters in the compliant sense of the rule while affirming this 
difference in another sense: thinking one is following a rule indeed still differs from following 
the rule, but on the straightforward grounds that the latter is an action with consequences for 
the rule-follower and the former is not, just as the former is really the counterpart of the sign 
and the latter is not.   In other words, PI 258 and PI 270 can be taken together as an argument 
that trivializes the conclusion of PI 202: if saying ‘what seems right to me is right’ means I no 
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longer have any right to speak of ‘right’ (that is, nothing follows from what seems right to me) 
and yet the sign ‘S’ can still become meaningful once the sensation called ‘S’ is found to be 
useful, then this shows that the difference affirmed in PI 202, namely, that between thinking 
one is following a rule and following a rule, is real but trivial and is not really an argument in 
support of a compliant picture of the rule.  Why?  Because it was thought in PI 202 that the rule 
itself, or a community of rule-followers forming a practice, had to be in some important sense 
an essential part of my action in following the rule, namely, as something independent of the 
rule-follower by which compliance can be determined, and without this rule or community 
agreement, my being said to follow the rule would fall apart through incoherence: the sameness 
of the rule with the rule-follower would undermine the normativity of the rule.  But PI 270 then 
showed us, contrary to Wittgenstein’s intention, that it no more follows that such would 
happen by following a rule ‘privately’ than that the sign ‘S’ would be meaningless without the 
independent criterion of correctness sought in PI 2581.   The usefulness of an action therefore 
has priority over whatever we say or think about this action, and this makes what we think 
inconsequential.  The only thing undermined by denying the importance of the difference in PI 
202 would be the compliant picture of the rule—a picture that is at best paradoxical. 
 
3.3     The Arbitrariness and Autonomy of the Sign 
 
We can perhaps now see why the sign in rule-following is autonomous, just as 
Wittgenstein insisted it was, since the use and usefulness of the sign can come apart, making 
use autonomous from its usefulness; but we can also see at the same time why he was misled in 
rule-following by focusing exclusively on rule-following with signs, since the sign in rule-
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following is really dispensable for rule-following and the exclusive analysis of it distorts our 
overall view of the nature of rule-following, such that we end up seeing it as analogous to 
obeying an order, where the rule itself, like an order, is something with which the rule-follower 
complies.  Wittgenstein’s comparison of grammar with cooking is a good illustration of this 
point (cf. Zettel 320).  Following Wittgenstein, it was thought that rule-following without 
signs, like baking or cooking, must be fundamentally different from rule-following with signs, 
like language or games, because the one is defined by its end while the other is not: hence the 
arbitrariness and autonomy of the rules of language or games.   But the fundamental difference 
spoken of here only relates to the difference between the use and usefulness of the sign; that is, 
in rule-following with signs, the mere use of the sign itself becomes a tool for action in another 
activity that is defined by its end; and this is really to say that the mere use of the sign is in fact 
the only way in which we can make an action a tool by itself, one which, as a tool, becomes 
useful for something else.  Hence this action-as-tool has, qua mere action and not qua tool, no 
definable purpose outside its mere use to give it its ‘shape’—maintaining this abstract ‘shape’, 
or mere use, would thus be its own purpose in a sense--and this is the reason why the sign is 
both arbitrary and autonomous and hence useful.  Wittgenstein no doubt looked at rule-
following, that is, rule-following with signs, as analogous to obeying an order, because in 
obeying an order, the action of the order-obeyer is also done without thought to its purpose, 
since the purpose of the order-obeyer is merely to execute the order and nothing else besides—
and he can only do that if he can act independently of whatever consequences for him follow 
directly from his action; he has simply transferred his action’s consequences for himself to its 
consequences for another: his action is now a conditioned form of independence, like that 
characterizing the slave in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, since the independence the slave has 
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attained for himself is nothing other than his ability to act against his own inclinations and self-
interests and for those of another.  In other words, the natural unity of action and purpose 
within the order-obeyer has been sundered, just as practice and function came apart in the 
orthography of certain words in English; but the dismemberment of the obeyer’s actions from 
his own purposes under this unity is not to no purpose, because his actions now still have life 
by being freely dispersed and grafted onto the purposes of another who unites both in a higher 
unity, for example, in the institution of slavery.  It is in fact the slave who must reply, when 
asked to justify his action, with “This is simply what I do”, since his purpose is now simply to 
act, that is to say, to do an action for its own sake, albeit for the sake of another; the action qua 
action is everything for the slave, just as the master’s practical use of the slave qua slave is 
everything for the master.  Thus the action of the order-obeyer is in a sense arbitrary and 
autonomous, too, provided that he focuses only on the execution of the order and not on the 
consequences of his action under the order.  The one who obeys an order is indeed a tool for 
action for another, namely, for the one who gives the order; yet at the same time, this order-
obeyer would not himself be useful to the order-giver unless he could function as a tool in this 
sense of being autonomous or independent.   
The action-as-tool, or sign-usage, is equally the material out of which a practice is 
moulded into a certain shape.  Just as the nature of iron is not defined by the uses made of it 
but is rather chosen in manufacturing for its own particular nature, the mere use of the sign, 
too, is not directly defined by the uses made of it; but this mere use of the sign itself won’t be 
meaningful unless this use is made useful, since the mere use of a sign has no power to confer 
meaning; this also means, therefore, that, although the sign’s meaning, or identity, is thereby 
overdetermined through its mere use, such overdetermination is still useless unless the sign 
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also becomes useful at the same time.  After all, we can still spell ‘knight’ with a ‘k’ and 
simply continue our previous usage to determine this spelling as correct, but this continuation 
of practice actually makes no real difference for correct spelling, since spelling now has no 
connection in this case to how the word is pronounced based on its spelling; overdetermination 
of the sign may itself be arbitrary, but still only in a meaningless way, because whether we 
actually spell ‘knight’ with a ‘k’ or not no longer really matters—it is now ‘correct’ merely for 
the sake of form; it is a formal correctness lacking any real content.   
We have already seen, for example, that what is overdetermined in a stipulation is the 
result, but that this result is in fact not a consequence of an action but is part of the action itself, 
that is, it is still an action with no consequences for the one who acts.  Thus action and result in 
a stipulation are not united as action is to purpose but are simply identified through abstraction, 
since such a result is neither a purpose nor the fulfillment of a purpose, but is now just part of 
the sign itself; this abstract action thus becomes its own result, its own inconsequential 
consequence.  But action and result can only be united in this way, that is, simply identified in 
a stipulation through abstraction, within a practice that is already established without such a 
stipulation, and that practice will already have consequences for the rule-follower.  Moreover, 
the sameness of an action that is overdetermined is likewise still dependent on an activity 
defined by its end and already established without signs, since this abstract sameness in the 
sign is really just the difference in action that makes no difference, that is, these actions make 
no difference to the outcome of the action-as-tool; and so the sameness of an action in a rule-
governed activity involving signs is determined as the same, not just through the 
overdetermination of a rule, or through what we call the ‘same’, but through the fact that this 
stipulated result, whatever it is, actually makes no difference to the outcome of the action-as-
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tool, that is to say once again, to its usefulness as an action in another activity: sameness here 
is really just the difference that makes no difference.  It is therefore a mistake to see grammar’s 
arbitrariness and autonomy as exclusive of purposes or ends, since sign-usage is really just an 
action expressing this duality of action—a mere use that is at the same time an action that is 
actually useful for something other than its mere use2.   
 
3.4   The Generality of the Sign 
 
The generality of the sign, its ‘universal’ nature, is directly related to the usefulness of the 
sign, since the natural unity of an action with its purpose, manifested in nature in so-called 
‘desire’, after being sundered in the case of the sign, is replaced in the sign with the arbitrarily 
determined but essential unity of the use and usefulness of the sign; and this usefulness now 
becomes the portal through which the action re-establishes its normative connection to some 
purpose: hence the usefulness of the sign gives the sign its portability throughout a multiplicity 
of activities defined by different ends.  This portability of the sign just is the sign’s generality 
or universality; the sign, by becoming useful, thus indirectly comes into contact with purpose, 
even possible future purposes, as any tool would through its nature qua tool.   The universality 
of the sign, therefore, is not proof of the sign’s communal nature but of its instrumental nature; 
it is the bridge between an arbitrary action (or mere use) and a definite end; and this 
universality is tied to a community of rule-followers only in the sense that what is portable by 
nature is also sharable with others, and hence teachable to others.  By being made portable in 
this way, the sign becomes abstract; hence the sign itself is just an abstract action. 
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The portability of any particular sign, however, is merely externally connected to any 
definite end, though the portability of the sign itself is internally connected to purpose through 
its usefulness.  The usefulness of the sign, in other words, has the nature of a ‘third thing’ or 
intermediary; it is the virtual purpose of an action that has been elevated to the level of 
abstraction, since a virtual purpose is simply the shape of an abstract action or mere use 
functioning as though it were itself the purpose of that action, even though this action, this 
virtual purpose, is really just a mere action.  Indeed, a virtual purpose is not really a ‘third 
thing’, strictly speaking, but simply an action, abstracted from any definite purpose, that can 
then be used as part of another action, a concrete one with a definite purpose, as though the two 
actions were really the same action, that is to say, as though the purpose of the abstract action 
were the purpose of the concrete one.  The portability of the sign, based on its usefulness, thus 
provides the generality that is necessary in order to give justifications of various actions, that 
is, to make universal judgments about these actions.  The sign is therefore used as a tool for 
showing compliance, even though giving a justification of an action is not true compliance; it 
only seems so because such judgments appear to be independent of the rule-follower himself—
but this ‘independence’ of the sign is only a dependent form of independence, like that of the 
slave. 
       
3.5 The Normativity of the Rule and Community Agreement 
 
  The sign or rule-formulation can thus function as a rule only because it has the portability 
that makes it independent of any activity in which it happens to be found.  In the compliant 
picture of the rule, normativity is established by the rule that is different from the rule-follower, 
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that is, by the rule that is independent of the rule follower.  But the sign acts as just such a rule, 
or rather, it projects itself as such a rule.  This rule is what the rule-follower appeals to when he 
is asked to justify his action.  In the community view of rule-following, this role of the rule is 
taken over by the community in the form of ‘community agreement’, or a ‘consensus of action’ 
between rule-followers.  This is why it is argued that a community of rule-followers is 
necessary for rule-following, since a single rule-follower cannot make the distinction for 
himself between thinking he is following a rule and following a rule; and without this 
distinction, the normativity of the rule would collapse, leaving no rule at all: whatever seemed 
right to the rule-follower would then be right (PI 258).  It is impossible, therefore, to follow a 
rule ‘privately’ (PI 202).  There must still be a rule that is different from, that is, independent 
of, the rule-follower; compliance demands that it be so. 
The advocates of the community view of rule-following nevertheless have two different 
roles for community agreement in explaining the normativity of the rule.  The most demanding 
is the role just outlined above, where ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ are determined by the agreement 
or disagreement of an action with that of a community of rule-followers.  In other words, an 
action is said to be ‘correct’ on this account if it agrees with this consensus, ‘incorrect’ if it 
does not.  This sense of ‘community agreement’ is straightforwardly compliant in nature, for it 
says that an action is ‘correct’ only if it complies with another action sanctioned as a standard.  
The community view cannot, however, explain further the normativity of this consensus of 
action, this action sanctioned as a standard—it simply exists as what we all do.  Hence the 
second role of community agreement in rule-following: it is a quiet agreement in action that 
functions as a precondition of anyone following a rule; it is to acknowledge that we all just go 
on in this same way. 
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It is necessary in the community view to have these two roles for community agreement, 
since they both together fulfill the function of the rule set out in the compliant picture of the 
rule.  The rule-follower’s dependence on the rule, for example, demands that community 
agreement make the rule-follower dependent on the community.  It does this by looking at the 
rule-follower as part of a larger whole, and thus as an individual essentially isolated and 
‘private’ when looked at by himself; this individual thereby becomes something necessarily 
‘social’, that is, he becomes an abstraction, like the slave qua slave.  The rule’s independence 
from the rule-follower, on the other hand, makes this same community of rule-followers 
exempt from such dependence, even though this community itself is made up of these same 
individuals; it is argued that these collective actions themselves cannot be treated in the same 
way; they are a precondition of normativity, so-called ‘background practices’; these actions are 
what we call ‘following the rule’ and ‘going against it’ from case to case (PI 201).  
But this ‘consensus of action’ must now take the form of a sign or rule-formulation, as a 
description of “what we all do when we follow the rule”, that is, community agreement is now 
also made into an abstraction.  Advocates of the community view are always quick to point 
out that the agreement they are speaking of is not an agreement in opinions or words but in 
actions.  So be it.  It should nevertheless be obvious that if the rule-follower’s action is not 
guided or measured by another rule-follower’s action, as it actually is in the case of teacher and 
pupil, then it can only be guided or measured by this ‘consensus of action’, that is, by an 
abstract action.  And the only abstract action is an action involving signs—our saying what 
‘following the rule’ is.  The paradox here is then: this consensus of action is a consensus only 
because someone says that it is so—someone who already knows how to follow the rule (cf. PI 
224).  For the pupil, this someone is his teacher, who uses this abstract action—the sign or 
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rule-formulation—as an instrument to teach the pupil how to follow the rule using signs.  This 
‘consensus of action’, then, is really such a sign, even though we think that it is something 
beyond the teacher himself, something independent of the teacher that the teacher brings the 
pupil in contact with.  But what the teacher is really doing by using these signs—by making 
references to a ‘context’, a ‘consensus of action’, a ‘rule’—is teaching the pupil at the same 
time how to think, that is, think abstractly about the rule, and so make judgments or give 
justifications in rule-following.  The abstract difference between rule and rule-follower in the 
compliant picture of the rule has instead been made here into the abstract difference between 
community and individual.  The amended formulation of this abstract difference is now 
expressed in the community view by saying that the rule-follower follows a rule only if he does 
what we all do in following the rule.   
 
3.6  Kripke, Malcolm, and Medina on Normativity and Community Agreement 
  
Despite the differences of exposition within the community view of rule-following, the 
advocates of this view all accept the compliant picture of the rule.  And in some form or other, 
Wittgenstein’s claim in PI 202, that one cannot follow a rule ‘privately’, plays an important 
part in reaffirming this picture of the rule.  In Kripke’s case, for example, PI 201 and PI 202 
are taken together as the summation of the so-called ‘private language argument’ (Kripke, 3); 
for Malcolm, “[a] consideration of fundamental importance, which [Wittgenstein] brings out in 
PI 202, is the necessary distinction between one’s following a rule, and one’s thinking one is 
following a rule” (Malcolm 2, 28).  Similarly, Bloor, after citing PI 202, says: “To believe in a 
rule is one thing; for there really to be a rule is another.  What is it for there to be a rule?  
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Wittgenstein’s answer was clear.  The authentic, independent or ‘extrinsical’, existence of a 
rule—independent or extrinsic, that is, to any individual consciousness—consists in its being a 
social institution” (Bloor, 55).  And Medina, too, pays tribute to the conclusion of PI 202 by 
laying out its implications for normativity: 
It is important to notice that the claim that “‘obeying a rule’ is a practice” serves to 
convey two distinct points: first, that to follow a rule is not something we can do 
only in thought, that it must be public; and second, that to follow a rule is not 
something we can do only in private, that it must be social.  The public and social 
character of rule following is substantiated with two different arguments: the 
Manifestation Argument and the Private Language Argument.  These arguments 
support and elaborate the conclusions of the Paradox of Interpretation, emphasizing 
the crucial dependence of the normativity of our actions on our actual and shared 
practices of rule following. (Medina, 178) 
 
For all these advocates of the community view, normativity is necessarily tied to the rule that is 
different from, and hence independent of, the rule-follower.  It is thought that PI 202 makes 
this point clear by showing the important difference between thinking one is following the rule 
and following the rule.  Like Wittgenstein, they have assumed all along the compliant picture 
of the rule, only in this case, the rule now takes on the form of community agreement. 
Let us then briefly look at the way Kripke brings out this picture of compliance in his 
account of rule-following.  He does this by elaborating the paradox of interpretation as outlined 
in PI 201 in the form of a sceptical problem, ultimately solving this paradox through 
community agreement, that is, by having the rule-follower comply with the rule.  In his 
understanding of the paradox of interpretation, there is no fact about the rule-follower that 
establishes whether his present action conforms with his past usage of a sign; hence there is 
doubt whether he meant anything at all by this sign; meaning cannot gain a foothold here if 
such a fact cannot be found.  What Kripke is really saying, then, is that such a fact would be 
necessary in order to establish an objective standard with which the rule-follower’s action 
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could be said to comply or not.  Searching his own mind for such a ‘fact’, for example, will get 
the rule-follower nowhere, since “[w]hat can there be in my mind that I make use of when I act 
in the future?  It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air” (Kripke, 22).  
Lacking such a standard, that is, such a ‘fact’ about the rule-follower, there can be no 
normativity, and hence no meaning, for the rule.  What is in jeopardy here is not so much the 
normativity of the rule, however, as the compliant picture of the rule.  Kripke’s solution simply 
finds another form of compliance in which the normativity of the rule can be preserved.   
A sceptical problem is posed, and a sceptical solution to that problem is given.  The 
solution turns on the idea that each person who claims to be following a rule can be 
checked by others.  Others in the community can check whether the putative rule 
follower is or is not giving particular responses that they endorse, that agree with 
their own.  The way they check this is, in general, a primitive part of the language 
game.  (Kripke, 101) 
 
Kripke can now connect his solution to the paradox of interpretation with Wittgenstein’s 
‘private language argument’ by bringing in a community of rule-followers. 
What is really denied [in the private language argument] is what might be called  
the ‘private model’ of rule following, that the notion of a person following a given 
rule is to be analyzed simply in terms of facts about the rule follower and the rule 
follower alone, without reference to his membership in a wider community. 
 […]  
Our community can assert of any individual that he follows a rule if he passes 
the tests for rule following applied to any member of the community.  (Kripke, 109-
110) 
 
Kripke has indeed changed his picture of the rule in his sceptical solution, but only the 
superficial rendering of this picture.  The deeper compliant picture of the rule has remained 
intact—that form of the picture determining how the community view really thinks about the 
rule.  But did these superficial changes to the picture make any real difference to the debate 
over the social nature of the rule? 
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Malcolm, for example, thinks that Kripke’s analysis of Wittgenstein is wrongheaded, 
even though he ultimately agrees with Kripke about the social nature of rule-following.  In 
other words, what Kripke got right in his account is his retention of the compliant picture of 
the rule, the view in which the rule is merely substituted by community agreement.  With 
Malcolm, however, we first begin to see the compliant picture of the rule fall apart.  In the 
compliant picture, for instance, the rule is conceived as both a guide and a measure for the rule-
follower, since the rule has these dual uses, which go hand in hand with the independent nature 
of the rule.  In Malcolm’s account, the rule as guide is attacked, while the rule as measure is 
vigorously defended.  But what is attacked in the notion of the rule as guide is unfortunately 
only the concept of the rule in which the meaning of the rule in our own mind guides us.  In 
this case, being guided by the rule is treated as though it were merely our thinking we are 
following the rule.  What Malcolm actually stumbled upon in his criticism of the rule as guide 
is the uselessness of the compliant rule, that is, the uselessness of the sign or rule-formulation 
to guide us further in following the rule; he shows here a dim awareness that the compliant rule 
is really not a rule at all, but is somehow connected to our thinking about the rule.  When he 
dismisses what we think we are doing in following the rule, he is really just dismissing the role 
of this sign or rule-formulation in rule-following; he failed to comprehend that the rule as 
measure suffers a similar fate, since it, too, only takes the form of a sign or rule-formulation, 
albeit as ‘community agreement’ or a ‘consensus of action’. 
Malcolm’s defense of the rule as measure shows just how powerful the compliant picture 
of the rule is in the community view of rule-following.  He is blind to the fact that the only 
measure of the rule-follower’s action available to the community view—‘community 
agreement’—exists only as the same sign he attacked as useless in guiding the rule-follower in 
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following the rule, that is, it now exists only as a description of what we all do in following the 
rule: this measure is just an abstract action, that is, a mere sign  One can describe what we all 
do in following the rule as much as one likes—this ‘community agreement’ will still exist only 
as an extended form of a sign or rule-formulation, expressed by someone who already knows 
how to follow the rule, thus manifesting his expertise.  But Malcolm does not see any of this. 
When Wittgenstein says that following the rule is a practice, I think he means that a 
person’s actions cannot be in accord with a rule unless they are in conformity with a 
common way of acting that is displayed in the behaviour of nearly everyone who 
has had the same training.  This means that the concept of following a rule implies 
the concept of a community of rule-followers.  When Wittgenstein says, also in PI 
202, that one cannot follow a rule ‘privately’, I think he means that the actions of a 
single individual, whether these actions are private or public, cannot fix the meaning 
of a rule.  Wittgenstein relies, in PI 202, on a simple but powerful point, namely 
that the concept of a rule implies a distinction between following a rule and 
believing one is following a rule.  A person can believe that he is following a rule 
and be wrong. 
 This distinction could not be made if the actions of a single individual could fix 
the meaning of a rule.  The meaning of the rule would be exhibited in whatever this 
person did.  If it seemed to him that he was ‘doing the same thing’ in following the 
rule as he had done previously, then he would be doing the same thing. 
 We easily see that this is an absurd consequence.  This shows that the actions of 
a single individual, who believes that he is following a rule, must be measured 
against something other than his own actions.  (Malcolm 1, 156). 
 
But the only thing this distinction shows is that there is a difference between rule-following 
with signs and rule-following without signs, and that the sign is dispensable in rule-
following, just as what we think in relation to the rule is dispensable.   We can express this 
point similarly, by saying that thinking about the rule and following the rule are two 
different but related activities—and what, or whether, one thinks about the rule is irrelevant 
to following the rule.  Malcolm only insists on this distinction because he thinks that it 
reaffirms the compliant picture of the rule.  He is only half right: it simply reaffirms the 
uselessness of the compliant rule, and with it the uselessness of ‘community agreement’ in 
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determining the normativity of the rule.  Since Malcolm readily concedes that the rule-
follower’s action is not actually measured against anyone else’s action, it can only then be 
‘measured’ against some kind of common action—but this ‘common action’ can only be an 
abstract action, that is, the sign itself.   The problem for Malcolm is that he does not really 
understand what compliance actually is. 
Medina’s view suffers a similar fate.  We have already seen how Medina 
characterized the pupil in learning to follow the rule: he needs to have an attitude of ‘total 
submission to the authority of the master, of blind obedience to her commands” (Medina 
163).  Behaving in a regular way is drilled into the pupil, “[f]or drilling certainly involves 
conditioning processes that establish behavioral patterns.  However, the creation of these 
patterns in only one step towards the ‘consensus of action’ that is the goal of the training” 
(165).  “For Wittgenstein, the process of learning is completed when the learner becomes 
blindly committed to a particular way of acting and talking (cf. RFM VI.7).  By the end of 
the training period, the course of action sanctioned as correct by the teacher is viewed by 
the learner as the necessary outcome of applying the rule” (166).  This way of 
characterizing the learning of the pupil is in line with the social nature of the rule endorsed 
by the community view—it is essentially coercive.  Given the view of the rule-follower as 
the one who acts now by “instinct”, now by “automatic reactions”, now by “subjective 
feelings and tendencies”, it is not difficult to see the necessary remedy for these 
individualistic impulses.  In order to become a member of society in good standing, the 
rule-follower must be reshaped by training into our own image: coercion is simply his rite 
of initiation.  Medina himself calls this process “initiate learning” (163).   
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Although Medina says that, in his version of the community view, community 
agreement “only constrains but does not determine” the normative behaviour of the 
community of rule-followers, his contextualist account of normativity still fully subscribes 
to the compliant picture of the rule, just as it re-enforces the abstract difference between the 
community and the individual.  It makes little difference whether you now call this rule a 
‘context’, or a ‘consensus of action’, or a ‘precondition’ of following the rule.  In all these 
metamorphoses of the compliant rule, this rule still exists only in the form of the sign or 
rule-formulation, as what we call ‘following the rule’ and ‘going against it’ from case to 
case.  The concept of community agreement itself contains the concept of compliance in 
the community view, since the agreement discussed here is not the mutual agreement 
among peers but the asymmetric agreement characteristic of compliance—that is to say, the 
rule-follower must agree with the community if he is to be a part of this community, not 
the other way around.  As we will later see, the compliant rule is not something the rule-
follower actually complies with anyway, since the compliant rule is not really a rule at 
all—it is simply the sign itself. 
 
3.7 The Misunderstanding of Compliance in Rule-following 
 
The community view is not alone in misunderstanding the nature and role of 
compliance in rule-following.  Baker and Hacker, who champion the individualistic view 
of rule-following, also misunderstand the concept of compliance with a rule.  They make 
the mistake of thinking that, because the genesis of an ability can be separated from the 
question of whether someone has that ability, rule-following does not require more than 
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one individual for the idea of compliance with a rule.  But ‘compliance’ only makes sense 
when there is more than one individual, since compliance appears as the imitation of 
another’s action and is therefore founded on the relation between teacher and pupil, if not 
between parent and child.  The expressions ‘following a rule’ and ‘an action which accords 
with the rule’ would not have the meaning they do save being originally forged within that 
relation.  And so the concept of ‘following the rule’ already contains that relation in its 
expressions as does the concept of ‘compliance with a rule’; but the relation between 
teacher and pupil is not the final stage of rule-following; it is really only its initial stage or 
beginning.  Baker and Hacker have therefore also misunderstood the role of community in 
rule-following, namely, the role of the relation between teacher and pupil in the expressions 
of rule-following.  Rule-following is essentially a genealogical phenomenon, founded 
within a genealogical community; and it is only within this community that compliance 
makes any sense.  It is also the only form of compliance that is part of the pliant picture of 
the rule.   
 
3.8 The Misunderstanding of Internal Relations in Rule-Following 
 
Baker and Hacker say that Wittgenstein’s understanding of the internal relation 
between a rule and its application is a fundamental insight of his into the nature of rule-
following; they go on to say that “[t]he rule and its application are internally related, for we 
define the concept ‘following this rule’ by reference to this result” (RGN, 149).  But what 
Baker and Hacker fail to recognize throughout their discussion of internal relations is that 
there are really two different internal relations at work in the compliant picture of the rule, 
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since the compliant picture requires the maintenance of the abstract difference between rule 
and rule-follower.  The first internal relation, therefore, concerns the rule itself; it is the 
relation between the rule and its application, or between the rule and acts that are said to be 
in accord with the rule.  We could call this relation ‘the definition of the rule’.  The second 
internal relation concerns the rule-follower; it is the relation between the rule-follower’s 
understanding of the rule and the action which manifests his understanding.  We could call 
this relation ‘the manifestation of the rule’.  Why must there be these two different internal 
relations in the compliant picture?  Because compliance with a rule requires that rule and 
rule-follower be externally related and not merely internally related, since the rule must 
still be an independent guide and measure for the rule-follower.  What is really happening 
in the compliant picture is that the rule of the first internal relation, the sign, ends up 
externally related to the action which manifests the rule-follower’s understanding of the 
rule, that is, the action of the second internal relation: this external relation just is 
compliance with the rule, since the rule-follower’s action is said to comply with this rule 
only if it falls under what we call ‘following the rule’.  This external relation is made 
possible because of the difference between rule-following with signs (the first internal 
relation concerning criteria of correctness, that is, the definition of the rule) and rule-
following without signs (the second internal relation concerning the rule-follower and his 
actions).  The confusion for Baker and Hacker is in not seeing that the ‘acts which accord 
with the rule’ of the first internal relation are not really acts so much as descriptions of 
these acts, since the description of these acts constitutes the definition of the rule, and a 
definition, like a description, exists only in the form of a sign or rule-formulation.  That is 
why a rule and its application are internally related: one sign is simply defined in terms of 
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another sign.  (Bringing in ostensive definition is useless at this point, that is, signs that are 
defined by actions, since an ostensive definition forges the meaning of the sign and shows 
the dependence of the sign on an action—the reverse of compliance with a rule.  The sign 
must already be established or defined for it to function as a rule in the compliant sense, 
and this means the action is now described in signs so as to function as such a rule.) 
Compliance will not work here for Baker and Hacker, however, since not only is the 
first internal relation dependent on, not independent of, the second internal relation (the 
first is forged in the action of the second), but the first internal relation is itself just a 
different manifestation of the rule-follower’s understanding, that is, of his expertise.  This 
is why, in the pliant picture of the rule, both internal relations are really one and the same, 
in the sense that rule and rule-follower are one and the same.  The sign is really just 
another manifestation of the rule-follower being the rule, because it is always the rule-
follower alone who states the rule, even though he need not state it at all—his action by 
itself is sufficient for his following the rule.  In other words, the sign is an external and 
hence unnecessary manifestation of the rule-follower’s understanding, whereas his action is 
an internal and hence necessary manifestation of this same understanding.  If this is so, 
then the sign, whether as a description or definition of the rule, cannot establish the 
normativity of the rule; and so the description falling under what we call ‘following the 
rule’ is a false measure of the rule-follower’s action; it is simply a picture of the rule-
follower’s action that is drawn by the rule-follower himself.  It will be shown later that, 
because the normativity of the rule is constituted by its meaning or identity, the identity of 
the sign that is overdetermined by its mere use actually rests upon the deeper identity called 
‘the purpose of the rule’.  It is only this latter identity that establishes the normativity of the 
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rule, for the identity of the sign is itself forged and sustained in this deeper identity.  This 
deeper identity is just the rule-follower himself, a living genealogical identity, a human 
being. 
We can now perhaps see why Wittgenstein’s followers have overrated the difference 
between thinking one is following a rule and following a rule when it comes to the 
normativity of the rule; after all, it is agreed by them that what is right in following the rule 
cannot simply be what the rule-follower thinks is right; the rule must therefore be 
something independent of what the rule-follower thinks he is doing in following the rule, 
that is, the rule must be independent of the rule-follower himself.  But it makes no 
difference what he thinks when he follows the rule, since it is only the connection between 
the rule-follower’s action and his purpose in acting that makes all the difference in rule-
following—and this action is in fact independent of what the rule-follower thinks, but not 
independent of the rule-follower.  If the rule-follower can learn to follow the rule without 
the use of signs, then what connection can there possibly be between his thinking that he is 
following the rule and his following the rule?  He cannot even say what he is doing, much 
less what he is thinking; he cannot justify his action or appeal to anything outside his doing 
what he does in following the rule; and even if he were to give an answer when challenged, 
a proper answer would only be in the form of an action—his actually following the rule.  
For him to justify his own action by citing a rule-formulation would be as superfluous as 
appealing to community agreement; it would make no difference to his following the rule, 
since giving justifications is a different activity from the activity being justified.  If it does 
anything, pointing out the difference between thinking one is following the rule and 
following the rule only makes thinking here trivial, that is, inconsequential in rule-
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following; and this would be just another way of expressing the view that rule-following 
using signs is inessential for rule-following.  In other words, thinking in relation to the rule 
has no connection to the normativity of the rule; thinking is only brought into the 
discussion of rule-following because of the phenomenon of the sign, as the external form 
thinking takes concerning the rule.  But the sign, as we said, is dispensable in rule-
following, just as what we think is.  Hence ‘privacy’ is no issue at all in rule-following.  
The community and individualist views of rule-following thus amount to the same 
view in the end.  Not only do both subscribe to the compliant picture of the rule, both end 
up appealing to the sign as this same rule: the community view elevates ‘community 
agreement’ or ‘consensus of action’ to the status of the compliant rule; the individualist 
view of Baker and Hacker simply cites the ‘rule’ in the form of a description of what we 
call ‘following the rule’, as a justification for the way the rule-follower follows the rule.  
Since this sign is itself an abstraction and simply the external form abstract thinking takes 
in relation to the rule, compliance now becomes the abstract compliance of an abstract 
individual’s action with another’s abstract action.  In the sign alone, therefore, resides the 
abstract difference between rule and rule-follower, which is at the heart of the compliant 
picture of the rule.  This picture brings out explicitly the essence of the sign: that is, the 
sign is that mere use which also becomes what it is not—it is the rule that is there yet not 
there.  The sign merely expresses this essence to us through the trivial difference it makes 
between thinking one is following a rule and following a rule, by making itself different 
from following the rule, that is, thinking one is following a rule is not following a rule.  The 
compliant rule is thus divided within itself—it says that it is a rule when it is really just a 
statement of the rule.  In truth, there is no such compliant ‘rule’, because there is no 
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substance to this picture of the rule; rule and rule-follower are really one and the same; that 
is to say, the rule is really a living substance, a human being.  The only genuine rule is thus 
the pliant rule. 
 
Notes for Chapter 3 
 
1. PI 258: “Let us imagine the following case.  I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a 
certain sensation.  To this end I associate it with the sign ‘S’ and write this sign in a calendar 
for every day on which I have the sensation.—I will remark first of all that a definition of the 
sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.—How? 
Can I point to the sensation?  Not in the ordinary sense.  But I speak, or write the sign down, 
and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point to it 
inwardly.—But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be!  A definition surely 
serves to establish the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of 
my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the 
sensation.—But ‘I impress it on myself’ can only mean: this process brings it about that I 
remember the connexion right in the future.  But in the present case I have no criterion of 
correctness.  One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right.  And that 
only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.” 
 
2. PI 260: “‘Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again.’—Perhaps you believe that you 
believe it! 
     Then did the man who made the entry in the calendar make a note of nothing whatever?—
Don’t consider it a matter of course that a person is making a note of something when he 
makes a mark—say in a calendar.  For a note has a function, and this ‘S’ so far has none. 
     (One can talk to oneself.—If a person speaks when no one else is present, does that mean he 
is speaking to himself?)” 
 
3. PI 270: “Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign ‘S’ in my diary.  I discover that 
whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shews that my blood-pressure rises.  So I 
shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus.  This is a 
useful result.  And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation right 
or not.  Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least.  And that 
alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show.  (We as it were turned the 
knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of the machine; but it was a mere 
ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all.) 
     And what is our reason for calling ‘S’ the name of a sensation here?  Perhaps the kind of 
way this sign is employed in this language-game.—And why a ‘particular sensation’, that is, 
the same one every time?  Well, aren’t we supposing that we write ‘S’ every time?” 
 
4.  It might be claimed that the manometer, a ‘public object’, functions in PI 270 as the 
independent criterion of correctness for using the sign ‘S’—thus ruling out a ‘private’ use of 
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the sign ‘S’—but as will be shown later, the sign ‘S’ only becomes useful, and hence 
meaningful, once the sensation is found to be useful; and if indeed the sensation can be found 
to be useful, it will still be useful independently of the manometer with which it has been 
correlated, since the readings of the manometer themselves become useful, and likewise 
meaningful, like the sign ‘S’, only because the sensation itself is useful.  The manometer 
perhaps helped in the discovery of the usefulness of the sensation but was not essential for its 
usefulness; on the contrary, both the manometer and the sign ‘S’ are dispensable in this case, 
since the one merely reads the sensation and the other only stands for it.  
     If it was the manometer that in fact made the sensation ‘public’ in this case, and hence 
legitimized the sign ‘S’ for our linguistic purposes—wouldn’t that manometer merely confirm 
for us the ‘privacy’ of the sensation itself?  And suppose the manometer hadn’t yet ‘outed’ the 
sensation in question from its ‘privacy’ by being correlated to it—would that thereby render 
the sensation useless, and so make the sign ‘S’ meaningless as a result?  How could that 
follow?  After all, the sign ‘S’ does not stand for the readings of a manometer but for the 
sensation that is also read by the manometer.  The meaning of the sign ‘S’ stands or falls with 
the sensation, therefore, and not with the readings of the manometer; and this is just to say that 
the sign ‘S’ and the sensation are internally related just as the readings of the manometer and 
the sensation are internally related, and the sign ‘S’ is related to the readings of the manometer 
only through the sensation: the internal relations here are not simply grammatical but physical, 
too, since the usefulness of the sensation was discovered through its correlation with the 
manometer, though it could have just as easily been discovered from the sensation’s own—
usefulness. 
 
5. Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, p. 110: “Does this mean that 
Robinson Crusoe, isolated on an island, cannot be said to follow any rules, no matter what he 
does?  I do not see that this follows.  What does follow is that if we think of Crusoe as 
following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria for rule-
following to him.  The falsity of the private model need not mean that a physically isolated 
individual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an individual, considered in isolation 
(whether or not he is physically isolated), cannot be said to do so.  Remember that 
Wittgenstein’s theory is one of assertability conditions.  Our community can assert of any 
individual that he follows a rule if he passes the tests for rule following applied to any member 
of the community.”   
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Chapter Four:  The Picture of a Paradox 
 
 
 
4.1  The Compliant and Pliant Pictures of the Rule 
 
 
The paradox of compliance boils down to this: if you already understand the rule, you 
cannot be guided by the rule, nor can your action be measured by the rule.  Alternatively, it 
makes no sense to say that one uses one’s own understanding to guide one’s action or to 
measure one’s action.  If I say that I use the rule and not my understanding of the rule to do 
this, then the rule here is something independent of my understanding, and hence 
independent of the action that manifests my understanding.  But then what rule is that?  
The sign itself?  But if a sign by itself, independently of one’s understanding of the rule and 
contrary to its own claim to be a ‘rule’ for me, can’t guide me or measure my action—and 
it can’t, since an action can only conform to another’s action, not an abstract action like the 
sign—then the sign, as a compliant rule, is a sham, for it lacks the substantive power of a 
true compliant ‘rule’—its ability to guide and measure—but nevertheless continues to 
project that power as though it did, substituting itself for the true compliant rule that is the 
teacher.   
A true compliant rule is something by which we are guided and measured as we act: 
hence the pictures of the rule as both a handrail and a yardstick.  Measuring itself is a 
certain kind of activity in which one thing is set against another in order to determine 
compliance.  But when the rule-follower follows the rule, he just acts.  There is no 
measuring of his action, unless someone then asks him for a justification of his action.   In 
this case, he is expected to give an answer, that is, he is expected to say why he is doing 
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what he does.  But the answer he gives is no true measure of his action, nor is it a true 
guide of his action; and even if this answer were to satisfy the one who asked the question, 
his satisfaction with this answer can be no measure either, since he could have been 
persuaded by any number of answers.  At any rate, we are no more measured or in need of 
being measured than we are guided or in need of guidance when we are following the rule; 
the rule-follower, in other words, need not give any justification of his action—he need not 
say anything in connection to his following the rule.  If this is so, then it is also the case 
that there is no need for ‘compliance with a rule’—not that ‘compliance with a rule’ makes 
no sense at all, but that it only makes sense in certain circumstances, namely, when 
someone is learning to follow a rule from someone else.  Here the teacher is the rule for the 
pupil, and both guides and measures his action.  The rigidity and constancy of this rule just 
is the role the expert plays for another in teaching the rule.  But for the rule-follower 
himself, there is no one to guide or measure his actions, and he does not do so for himself, 
since he need only act on his understanding.  The expert himself is a pliant rule; he is a 
compliant rule only for his pupil.  The sign is merely the tool used by the teacher for 
judging compliance, that is, for teaching the pupil to act as the teacher does. 
Without the notion of compliance for the rule-follower there seems to be no room for 
the connected notions of error and correction in following the rule.  But isn’t the rule-
follower correcting himself something like the body healing itself?  Surely ‘healing’ and 
‘health’ are normative notions comparable to ‘correcting’ and ‘following the rule’.  We 
think of the rule as something independent of the rule-follower, and the claim that a human 
being qua rule-follower could actually be this rule, such that he acts for himself, stands 
opposed to this view.  A rule that corrects itself seems imperfect somehow, something less 
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than a rule, allowing all kinds of worries to arise about its solidity because of an implied 
vulnerability to ‘corruption’, ‘error’, ‘illness’.  On the contrary, this characterization would 
just as well show the robustness of the rule, its ability to recover from errors in acting, from 
all the contingencies that surround a functioning, living usage.  (After all, the rule can 
sometimes fail).  But it is the sign that misleads us in this respect, because we think of it as 
something apart from the rule-follower’s action in following the rule, something that can be 
used as a guide or measure of this action.  The sign’s function here is to justify one’s 
action, like a written law one appeals to as a defense before a judge, whose externality and 
independence cast a shadow over everything that we do.  But the sign is really a false 
measure. 
Wittgenstein’s picture of the rule is deficient, therefore, because it cannot be used to 
show rule-following without the idea of compliance.  Although he knew about its 
paradoxical nature, his picture is nevertheless still that of a handrail or yardstick, something 
independent of the rule-follower which one uses and appeals to as both a guide and a 
measure for one’s action (something that one also follows blindly).  The rule-follower’s 
action is said to comply or not to comply with the rule.  Another picture, however, paints a 
different view, namely, that of the rule as something flexible and of a certain shape that 
bends and twists upon usage but always returns to its original shape.  Its strength, not 
weakness, lies in this flexibility without breaking—thus showing its robustness at the same 
time.  Here the rule may be a strong or a weak rule, depending on how much stress it can 
endure without breaking.  This picture of the rule is the pliant picture of the rule, as 
opposed to the compliant picture held by Wittgenstein and his followers.  Such a picture 
resembles that of a living organism, whose normal shape we might call its ‘health’.  This 
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organism is subject to all kinds of illness and injury, but nevertheless is able to recover 
from these by healing itself, by restoring itself to its normal shape or ‘health’.  Don’t forget 
that ‘health’, ‘illness’, ‘healing’ are normative concepts, no less than ‘rule’, ‘error’, and 
‘correction’.  If an organism is able to recover from all these evils while living, and can do 
so quickly without perishing, we call such strength the robustness of the organism.  So, too, 
is it with the pliant rule: it resembles a living organism in virtue of its capacity to restore 
itself to ‘health’—in fact, it is not just figuratively a living being--it is a living being, a 
human being. 
     It is important to know how each picture of the rule depicts an error.  The compliant 
picture depicts an error in rule-following as an act of non-compliance: to follow the rule 
incorrectly is to go against the rule or for one’s action not to measure up to the rule.  To 
determine that an error has occurred, then, requires that the rule measure one’s action.  The 
pliant picture, on the other hand, depicts an error in rule-following as a distortion of the 
rule.  An error is just a deviation in the course of one’s activity from the purpose of the 
rule, not an action that fails to measure up against another action.  A regular way of acting 
when following the rule will help show what this distortion looks like, and not every 
distortion will look the same.  The expert rule-follower will know what kinds of errors 
occur in following the rule, and thus will know what these distortions look like.  By 
grasping the purpose of the rule, the rule-follower has already defined these errors or 
distortions in a sense, since the rule is now just the rule-follower, and his errors become his 
deficiencies in performance; the rule-follower-cum-rule is thus the whole phenomenon of 
rule-following, containing his own errors through his ability to correct himself—that is, to 
remain whole. 
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Why does there seem to be little problem for the rule-follower’s action to conform to 
another’s, but there is a problem only when his action is said to conform to a sign or rule-
formulation?  It is because a human being has the innate ability to imitate other human 
beings and grasp the point of what they are doing.  Another human being can be a guide for 
us and a measure, too, and the problem of interpretation arises only in the case of the pupil 
imitating his teacher, since any interpretation of a rule is now simply the pupil’s imitation 
of his teacher.  In the case of an abstract action or sign, there is no natural, instinctive 
response in following that, except to imitate this same abstract action itself, by repeating 
the mere use of the sign.  All we really need in rule-following is to see someone doing 
something, and from there we will learn to pick it up.  It is hardly surprising that the 
compliant picture of the rule gives us such difficulty in understanding how one can follow 
the rule, especially when the sign can be interpreted by various actions.  We still mistake 
the rule for its formulation in signs; we have not yet fully recognized that the ability to give 
justifications for following the rule, or even just to describe it, and the ability to follow this 
same rule are different abilities.  Whether someone can actually give such a justification 
does not matter in the end, just as it does not matter what he thinks he is doing when he 
follows the rule.  The same goes for any use of the sign, even under the description of what 
we call ‘following the rule’. 
Only a human action has the form of a human action, and so to conform one’s action 
to a rule is really just to conform one’s action to that of another human being.  That is why 
it makes sense to be guided by a human being and to be measured by a human being.  Once 
again, we are saying that the rule is really just a human being.  Hence to conform or to 
comply with a rule is to form or bend one’s action to that of another in order to satisfy him 
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(conform < L. conformare: to make of the same form; comply < It. complire: to fulfill, 
complete).  To conform thus is to establish agreement between two beings of the same 
kind.  But to agree is not necessarily to conform or comply, because there is such a thing as 
mutual agreement, but not mutual compliance.  With compliance, one individual is 
independent of another and this other is dependent on him; as we have already seen, this is 
essentially the relation between teacher and pupil.  Two independent individuals, however, 
can agree with one another, even though one does not comply with the other; and an 
independent individual can also be said to agree with himself in this same sense of 
agreement.  For this reason, agreement does not imply compliance or dependence.  But it 
makes little sense to say that one conforms to one’s own actions when following the rule, 
even though one’s present action can agree with one’s past actions.  In the pliant picture of 
the rule, the only agreement that matters for the rule-follower is the agreement of the rule-
follower with himself, since it is a non-compliant form of agreement.  This is the form of 
agreement the teacher has with himself, and the pupil conforms his action to his teacher’s, 
not simply for the sake of agreeing with him in the compliant sense of agreement, but 
simply in order that he may be able to better grasp the purpose of the rule which then 
allows him to agree with himself, just as his teacher agrees with himself.  Agreement in 
action is thus the expression of independence in the rule-follower, not the expression of 
dependence on others—this agreement with himself says that he now belongs to himself 
and has become a whole being, that is, he can now act independently of others, since he has 
grasped the purpose of the rule and made it his purpose; agreement among rule-followers is 
necessary only as the expression of a common interest or purpose, and even in this case, 
such agreement cannot be the goal of our training to follow the rule—such non-compliant 
 88
agreement simply follows from our grasping the same purpose.  At any rate, the 
independence of the rule-follower is the goal of his training to follow the rule, even when 
agreement in action implies a common interest or purpose: true compliance is therefore just 
our training to become these independent rule-followers.  Grasping the purpose of the rule 
makes both the rule-follower independent of others and the rule pliant in nature; and only 
because the rule-follower is made independent in this sense is there agreement in action at 
all, even across individuals. 
One section in the Investigations that is often used to bolster the idea of compliance is 
PI 2651.  In this section, Wittgenstein explores the idea of looking up words in a dictionary 
which exists only in one’s mind and is used to justify the translation of one word by 
another.  This does not make sense, since such a dictionary cannot function as a standard 
for our justification of a translation, because we need to appeal to something independent 
and objective, not subjective like this dictionary.  In other words, we cannot test this 
dictionary in our memory for correctness, we cannot confirm its correctness independently 
of our memory.—But suppose I speak (and hence understand) both languages involved in 
translating these words from one language into another.  “Well, are you saying that in this 
case you would be using this dictionary in your memory, and so it does make sense after 
all?”  Not at all, because those who are bilingual and translate between languages they 
already understand do not look up anything in their memory.  They simply translate, 
perhaps trying out different sentences, different words as they go along; but no, they simply 
translate; they do not look up any words in a dictionary to justify their translation, whether 
this dictionary is subjective or objective.  “And so what is your point?  The whole idea of a 
physical dictionary points to the necessity of having something objective and independent 
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by which we can justify our translation.”  But this is my point: we don’t need a dictionary at 
all if we already understand both languages; we need no criterion of correctness 
independent of us if we can do that: we therefore need no justification either. 
 
4.2 The Essence of Rule-Following is Imitation of Action: The Unity of Action and 
Purpose 
 
We naturally think of imitation as a form of representation or depiction, that is, as 
something reproduced in a medium in some manner, whether linguistic or visual or 
auditory, in other words, through a sign or picture.  But this is not the imitation that occurs 
when one follows the rule, for nothing here stands in the way of the pupil following his 
teacher—certainly not a sign—for the pupil’s action is not a depiction of his teacher’s 
action, but becomes the same action, so that the pupil becomes the rule that he is learning 
to follow.  Consequently, there is no need for a medium of depiction here, just as there is 
no need for signs.  And since this is so, the pupil can and will become independent of his 
teacher by becoming a rule-follower himself and a teacher for others, because a depiction is 
still dependent on what is depicted, but the pupil depicts nothing by imitating his teacher; 
in addition, what he thinks while following the rule no longer matters at all, because all 
errors, obstacles, and dangers have become part of this rule, too; in fact, they are what give 
the rule its robustness and show its flexible nature. In short, the rule-follower has all he 
needs to follow the rule independently of others, and so the rule can only be a pliant rule, 
since his errors are not errors in thinking but in performance.  In fact, his ability to justify 
his actions or make judgments in rule-following demonstrates his independence of action.  
To require that the pupil’s action still conform to a sign or rule-formulation, even after he 
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has learnt to follow the rule, would amount to requiring that his action now conform to a 
depiction of what his teacher already does, and so make him still dependent on his teacher.  
This requirement, whether in the form of a ‘context’ that he is placed in, a ‘consensus of 
action’ that he joins, or a ‘rule’ that he complies with, would also have his actions 
essentially dependent on the depiction of actions—which is absurd.  When an action 
conforms to another action—for example, when the pupil imitates his teacher—the two 
actions become the same action, and once the pupil grasps the purpose of this action, both 
are now the same action independently of each other.  The compliant rule, which is really 
just the sign in disguise, is merely this depiction of an action in a foreign medium; and it 
can only depict this action because it is really an abstract action, for an abstract action is 
simply one that becomes something other than what it is by nature, that is, other than an 
arbitrary action or mere use.  The pupil’s imitation of his teacher’s action, however, does 
not involve a different medium of action like the sign but the same medium of action, since 
teacher and pupil are both human beings. 
By grasping the purpose of the rule that he is learning to follow and unifying his action 
with this purpose, the pupil not only becomes the rule that he is following, but he also 
becomes independent of his teacher, that is, he now belongs to himself.  This is the true 
independence characteristic of individuals within a genealogical community in which the 
individual is considered whole, a peer among peers.  The pupil who is said by us to have 
learned the rule only because he now does what we all do is the pupil who still belongs to 
us: he is just an abstraction for us, the description of someone who simply acts as we all do 
in following the rule.  But he belongs to us and not to himself only because we depict him 
through the sign, that is, we still insist that he comply with the rule that is independent of 
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him, and this compliance is reinforced by our description of him acting as we all do.  In 
truth, we still demand that he comply with us, as though we were his teacher.  We have not 
yet comprehended that, because this sign belongs only to us, this sign can never be 
independent of the rule-follower, and so cannot function as the rule that is independent of 
the rule-follower; in fact, the compliant rule is not a rule at all, but merely the sign itself, a 
tool for compliance used by the teacher.  The sign, as such a tool, constitutes an 
insubstantial form of identity.  The only substantial form of identity in rule-following is the 
pliant rule itself—that is, the pliant rule is the substantial self-identity of the rule-follower 
with the rule.   
 
4.3 The Essence of the Sign is Metaphor or Identity-in-Difference: The Unity of Simple 
Self-Identity and Simple Non-Identity with Itself. 
 
Metaphor is found in language.  One such metaphor that is in language says that a 
certain man is a lion, even though the man is really only a man and not at all a lion.  But 
what does this metaphor mean, then, by saying that the man is a lion, for a metaphor in 
language means something other than what those words literally mean?  Has the man leapt 
audaciously towards the lion, perhaps, sidestepping logic on his way?  Has some great 
logical chasm been traversed that would otherwise be impassible but through metaphor?  
Not really, since metaphor is not being illogical here, but is simply showing the depth of 
language and not its width or length; metaphor is bringing out a difference within language 
that is constantly being leveled or flattened into abstract sameness by the literal word or 
sign qua mere use, that is, by constantly saying that man is really only man and nothing but 
man; this is in fact what man is: man-is-man or man-is-himself.  This abstract sameness, 
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however, is only formal, without real content, and quite meaningless, since it simply 
presupposes the sameness of the sign qua mere use and then merely stutters this sameness 
to itself, uncomprehending the deeper sameness in the sign that gives it life, whose 
meaning has just been stripped down in language to a mere use or bare sign—the literal 
word; this abstract sameness has the form of a ‘this-is-this’ or a ‘this-is-itself’, what could 
be called simple self-identity.  But the difference in language brought out by metaphor is a 
difference within language that finds a certain sameness, and hence a certain meaning, by 
making no difference to the meaning of the literal words—by walking on their heads, so to 
speak, since man is still man, lion is still lion—and that difference between man and lion 
now has more depth of meaning than the literal words, precisely because metaphor itself is 
showing an arbitrariness and autonomy within language that is the shadow of the 
arbitrariness and autonomy of the sign itself; metaphor in language is in fact connected to 
language’s own nature, whose explicit form of self-reflection is now found in the more 
substantial ‘this’-means-this, or the identity-in-difference which is in language and says that 
‘man’ means man.  The deeper meaning in all metaphor, then, is that metaphor is really the 
essence of language and logic, that is, the essence of the sign itself; we can thus call the 
sign the original identity-in-difference; or, to say the same thing but differently, the sign is 
the original metaphor—the metaphor that is not in language but is language; it is that 
deeper identity which possesses content, confers meaning, bequeaths knowledge.   
Abstract sameness, or simple self-identity, is thus the sign qua mere use that only has 
the sameness of its form or ‘shape’ by overlooking any substance that goes with it, for its 
true substance—purpose qua usefulness—is still there and always was, but never simply 
qua mere use.  Thus in the compliant picture of the rule, we see the rule-follower as the one 
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who simply acts on the rule that is independent of himself and that determines his 
compliance with it, as though the rule-follower were like this sign qua mere use; 
consequently, we understand the rule-follower abstractly, too—despite our insistence that 
we are seeing him concretely in his brute actions, in his observable behaviour—by 
identifying him only with these simple actions, all the while still seeing the substance of his 
action only in the rule that is independent of him, not yet comprehending that the rule-
follower himself is in fact this substance, that is, the rule itself, since he now has grasped 
the purpose of the rule.  The compliant rule is merely the insubstantial reflection of this 
abstract conception of the rule-follower qua mere follower.  Indeed, ‘privacy’ in rule-
following has been understood as the incoherence of the rule-follower following the rule 
merely qua follower, since, by abstracting the rule from the rule-follower and his actions 
and making this rule different from the rule-follower, we find that there cannot now even 
be sameness in his merely acting the same.  Yet this incoherence only appears to be the 
case, because we have stripped the rule-follower of any substantial existence by placing 
him in a ‘context’ that defines him; the impossibility of following a rule ‘privately’ is thus 
the negative consequence of this abstract sameness depicted in the compliant picture of the 
rule, a picture in which the difference between rule-follower and rule is maintained only by 
seeing both the rule-follower and rule abstractly from one another: it is the picture of 
something independent of the rule-follower, an invisible extension of a rail that simply 
repeats itself in the form of an endlessly repeated self-same sign or rule-formulation—the 
this-is-this-is-this…(for example, the rule, or sameness, of the arithmetic series 2, 4, 6, 8… 
is the +2-is-+2-is-+2-is-+2…); we have thus failed to comprehend a deeper identity than 
this abstract identity, this abstract rule.  This identity is the substantial self-identity of the 
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rule-follower with the rule, that is, a different identity from the simple self-identity of the 
sign qua mere use or the identity-in-difference that is the essence of the sign itself.   It is the 
identity of a living being. 
Wittgenstein and his followers, however, had objected to the rule-follower following a 
rule ‘privately’ essentially because they had thought that simple self-identity itself was 
being made the identity at the core of the different applications of the rule in language or 
mathematics; and this simple self-identity could never by itself establish the meaning of the 
sign, that is, the sameness of the sign, because simple self-identity, the sign qua mere use, 
still lacked the substance provided by the rule which had to exist independently of the rule-
follower himself and with which his action had to comply.  They did not see that once the 
simple self-identity of the sign qua mere use became identified with rule-follower 
abstractly conceived, and so collapsed into incoherence, the simple non-identity that said at 
the same time that the rule-follower is not the rule had to be abandoned, too; in fact, 
Wittgenstein’s argument against following a rule ‘privately’ stretched the abstract 
difference between rule and rule-follower to the point of incoherence, so that this abstract 
difference itself should have collapsed and not the notion of ‘privacy’.  If following a rule 
‘privately’ is impossible, it is only because both rule and rule-follower are abstractly 
conceived as different.  But Wittgenstein clung to the trivial difference between merely 
thinking one is following a rule and actually following a rule in order to save the compliant 
picture of the rule, whose preservation requires the maintenance of this abstract difference.  
Wittgenstein failed to see that the rule-follower who “just acts, without reasons”, says 
“This is simply what I do”, and then “follows the rule blindly” is as abstract as the simple 
self-identity of the sign qua mere use. In truth, Wittgenstein’s rule-follower actually is this 
 95
simple self-identity, since the sign qua mere use just is the simple abstract action of the 
rule-follower that is both arbitrary and autonomous, while the compliant rule is merely the 
rule which he thinks he is following—the phantom rule supposedly independent of this 
simple self-identity called ‘the rule-follower’ and whose difference from this rule-follower 
prevents the rule-follower from following a rule ‘privately’: “hence following a rule is a 
practice” (PI 202), that is, doing what we call ‘following the rule’ (PI 201); it is a 
description of an action that the rule-follower must conform to if he is to follow the rule, an 
action that still exists only in the form of the sign.   
Without the sign in rule-following, then, there would be no abstract sameness or simple 
self-identity, for language is a form of abstraction and is just the unity of simple self-
identity and simple non-identity with itself.  In other words, the simple self-identity that 
says that A is A, and the simple non-identity that says that B is not A, are themselves 
united in the identity-in-difference that says that B is A.  We can state this identity-in 
difference explicitly in language by saying that ‘A’ means A.  Language itself thus shows 
once again that it has the nature of metaphor, because this unity of simple self-identity and 
simple non-identity with itself just means that the sign qua mere use, simple self-identity, 
becomes meaningful only when it also becomes what it is not—that is, more than a mere 
use, simple non-identity with itself.  We expressed this unity earlier as the unity of the use 
and usefulness of the sign; it could also be expressed as the unity of the finite and the 
infinite in the sign, since the sign qua mere use is just a simple abstract action and finite in 
nature, while what this sign qua mere use is not and what it could be useful for could be 
anything at all—it is simply not the sign qua mere use.  But the difference here within this 
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unity is merely an abstract difference that exists only in language, since it is really just the 
difference that constitutes the meaning (or identity) of the sign—its identity-in-difference. 
 
4.4 The Pliant Rule is a Living Genealogical Identity; Abstraction is the Power of 
Purposive Negativity 
 
Whereas the difference between rule and rule-follower manifested in the relation 
between teacher and pupil is a living difference in which what is different becomes the 
same through one becoming what the other already is, the difference that is said to exist 
between rule and rule-follower in language, and thus in the compliant picture of the rule, is 
merely the abstract difference made explicit in language by the simple non-identity that 
says that the rule is not the rule-follower: this latter difference is the abstract difference that 
still depends on abstract sameness, whose essential unity with this abstract sameness forms 
the identity-in-difference of the sign itself. The former difference is the difference between 
rule and rule-follower manifested through the generation of one rule from another in the 
relation between teacher and pupil and is thus a genealogical difference, one that 
regenerates genealogical sameness or substantial self-identity out of this difference; in 
other words, the rule-follower, by following the rule for himself and grasping its purpose, 
becomes the rule himself, a rule capable of generating another rule by also being the rule 
for another.  And all this comes down to saying that the compliant rule itself is really just a 
lifeless abstract identity whose only defining distinction is not to be the rule-follower and 
which thus exists only in the external form of a rule-formulation or sign, whereas the pliant 
rule is a living genealogical identity—not the sameness of an action lacking its own 
substance, only finding this substance in another through compliance, but the sameness of 
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this substance with itself, the rule-follower’s identity with the rule he is following, or, in 
the case of rule-following with signs, the return of the rule-follower from his simple 
abstraction in the form of an external self-same sign or rule-formulation back into himself 
qua purpose.  This is in fact why the sign in rule-following is not an essential part of rule-
following, and is hence dispensable for rule-following per se, since, qua mere use or as 
abstract identity, it is simply the difference that makes no difference in the end, or the 
action that is done for its own sake, albeit for another’s purpose; the sign itself really 
amounts to nothing in the end.  It is only the substantial self-identity of the rule-follower 
with the rule, a living genealogical identity, that really matters in rule-following: we call it 
‘the purpose of the rule’, or ‘the rule in the fullest sense’, or just ‘a human being’; this 
pliant rule is the higher rule which says that the Sabbath was made for Man, not Man for 
the Sabbath, since the Sabbath, like the compliant rule, is a mere observance and shadow of 
this higher rule; it is a purely formal custom attached to an arbitrary day with no intrinsic 
significance, except for its mere observer under the Law of Moses.  Everything in rule-
following, therefore, follows from this purpose; or rather, all roads lead back to it, even in 
the roundabout that is the sign.  And that is in fact the power of purposive negativity; it is 
the power which makes something from nothing. 
The abstraction in rule-following with signs is thus responsible for the peculiar way in 
which a rule of mathematics, for example, connects with purpose.  Since purpose 
establishes the normativity of the rule, abstraction must still somehow retain this 
connection, preserving at the same time the arbitrariness and autonomy of the sign.  We 
have already seen how it can do this through the usefulness of the sign, but we must also 
take note of how it can do this through the identity of the sign, since the identity of the sign 
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is just the sign’s meaning, that is, that which in fact constitutes the normativity of such a 
rule.  The correctness of a rule of mathematics, for instance, is never said to be based on the 
consequences of using the rule, as if something were true in mathematics only because we 
have ‘found it to pay’.  But this is not so far from the truth as one might think, since the 
stipulation of what is correct in a rule of mathematics takes the form of the abstract 
sameness of the sign qua mere use, and this abstract sameness itself owes its sameness to 
the deeper genealogical identity called ‘the purpose of the rule’.   The correctness of a rule 
of mathematics, formalized through a stipulation, is thus merely a formal correctness, like 
the formal correctness which says that ‘knight’ is correctly spelled with a ‘k’, even though 
the ‘k’ here no longer functions as a rule for pronunciation in English and it really makes 
no difference whether the word is now actually spelled with a ‘k’ or not.  In fact, it was 
already shown how practice and function came apart in the orthography of English, and this 
is what has also happened in the case of mathematics: the formal correctness of a rule of 
mathematics is a correctness divorced from any functional use the production of the sign in 
mathematics may have had—we simply repeat the production of the sign qua mere use, that 
is, the simple self-identity of the sign itself: “2 + 3 = 5”.  We then ignore the origin of the 
stipulation that occurred in a practice that already used rules of mathematics without 
stipulation, as if we were then to say that stipulation alone were enough to establish the 
correctness of a rule of mathematics and then justified this assertion by pointing out the 
arbitrariness and autonomy of the sign.  But stipulation is not enough.  Thus it is with 
formal correctness in general: there can be no formal correctness without connection to 
purpose, since the abstract sameness associated with formal correctness already 
presupposes a prior connection to purpose as its raison d’être and later re-establishes this 
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connection through the usefulness afforded by this abstract sameness; and this must be so 
because of the arbitrariness and autonomy of the sign.  And so the purpose of a rule of 
mathematics is not part of what is stipulated in a rule of mathematics but what makes such 
a stipulation even possible; not only that, but purpose also determines the character of the 
rule itself, what one does or can do with it, since the purpose is in an important sense the 
beginning or origin of the rule—that which begets the rule, so to speak.  Formal correctness 
in the use of signs is really the orphan who inherits his mortal character from the earthly 
purpose that has actually given him life, yet still believes he sprung fully grown and 
clothed in the form of a deathless being, like Athena from the head of Zeus.  But he is an 
orphan only because his action’s natural connection to purpose had been sundered on 
account of the nature of the sign, leaving him to substitute stipulation for this purpose as a 
virtual purpose, thereby transforming the mere use of the sign into something useful, so 
that now this formal correctness can be adopted by another’s purpose and given actual 
content, that is, a significant meaning.  Formal correctness, then, as the simple self-identity 
of a stipulation, is by itself an abstract identity and yet another expression of the compliant 
rule, since this formalness is also maintained by the equally abstract difference between 
rule and rule-follower.  Purpose alone prevents this formal correctness from completely 
breaking apart the unity of practice and function in rule-following.  What is anathema to 
linguistic meaning, therefore, is not ‘privacy’ but purposelessness, since the negativity in 
the sign which forges symbolic meaning just is a purposive negativity, the same negativity 
in the sign that says that it is what the sign qua mere use is not—that is, it is more than just 
a ‘dead’ sign or medium.  Purpose thus gives the sign a new kind of life it would otherwise 
not have—a life essentially moved through this creative negativity. 
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Show me a rule that is purely formal, and hence truly useless, and I will show you a 
rule that does not really exist.  Such a rule, of course, is the compliant rule, the same rule 
that says that it is a rule but really is not, since what it says it is is simply the grammatical 
projection of a power it does not have, that is, the power to guide and measure; its true 
power, if you will, is the power of negativity: it is the rule that is there but not there.  In 
fact, stating a rule one is following is merely thinking one is following a rule.  Hence it is 
not possible to follow a ‘compliant’ rule: otherwise stating a rule one is following would be 
the same thing as following it.   
What language distinguishes through abstraction is not only the difference between rule 
and rule-follower, however, but also the difference between the rule-follower and his 
context—the context that here merely substitutes for the rule by conditioning the simple 
action of the rule-follower, bestowing on his action its proper meaning.  But, as we saw 
earlier, the context of the rule-follower’s action, the ‘circumstances’ or ‘background’ of his 
performance, is actually dependent on the rule-follower himself and what he does in 
following the rule; the context is never already there, save the rule-follower already being 
there.  Thus the context, too, is the simple abstraction of language, since it exists, like the 
compliant rule, only in the external form of a sign or rule-formulation, as a description of 
what the rule-follower is doing when he “acts according to the rule”; nowhere else but in 
this sign is there a ‘context’, a ‘background’; the context has no independence from the 
rule-follower it describes, circumscribes, and then finally prescribes.  What we have really 
found in the context of the rule-follower’s action is just the rule-follower himself. The 
‘context’ is really just another expression of the compliant rule, an abstraction of language 
that is really just more language—and nothing more.  Appealing to this context is like 
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giving an ostensive definition to oneself: one cannot do that unless one already 
understands what one is attempting to define.  We only seem to get further in our 
understanding of the normativity of the rule when we look at the context of an action, but 
we really get no further than what we already understand about the rule, which is to say, we 
only get out of this context what we have already put into it—we are really just extending 
the rule-formulation further than it already was. When we then try to ‘decontextualize’ this 
action, it is not surprising that we think that we have fallen into the incoherence of 
following a rule ‘privately’; this ‘isolated’ action can no longer have a meaning by itself, 
no sameness through which we can call it ‘following the rule’, since it now resembles 
nothing that we know; we have once again removed the substance of the rule from itself, 
leaving the action lifeless and hollow; but we have actually only made a necessity of 
something which in truth is unnecessary, that is, we have made an unnecessary distinction 
that talks about the abstract difference between the rule-follower and his context.  Yet no 
one has ever clearly said what a ‘decontextualized’ action would be, how a rule-follower 
could ever be without a context.  But for all that, he still can’t be without a context!   That 
is what we are indeed inclined to say, since to say otherwise would be to speak nonsense, 
although we may just as easily be inclined to say that there is no such difference.  
This abstract difference between rule and rule-follower, which is the basis of 
Wittgenstein’s argument against following a rule ‘privately’, has already been drawn into 
his paradoxical picture of the rule, as the rule that is both there and not there.  The 
compliant rule is there only in the external form of a rule-formulation or the sign qua mere 
use, that is, as simple self-identity; yet when this sign qua mere use turns out to be really the 
simple abstract action of the rule-follower himself, the sameness of this sign becomes 
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identified with the different individual actions of the rule-follower, so that this rule, the 
sameness of the sign, breaks up into difference and is now forced into becoming what the 
rule-follower’s action is not, that is, a form of identity underlying these manifold actions of 
the rule-follower, extending beyond even the sign that is there.  Instead of being forced 
back into the rule-follower and taking on a substantial form of self-identity with the rule-
follower qua purpose, the compliant rule flees into the simplest and most abstract form of 
identity of all, that is, into nothing at all—the missing part of handrail that is still 
inseparably connected to the handrail as its extension; the compliant rule now takes the 
form of simple non-identity with the rule-follower, that is, simple non-identity with itself.  
But this compliant rule is really no rule at all, since it lacks any substantial existence of its 
own; it has no power to guide or to measure the rule-follower—it is not even independent 
of the rule-follower but is his mere shadow, following him instead of being followed.  The 
only form of identity and difference connected to the compliant rule is thus simple 
abstraction; and its entire life is spent in this simple abstraction, one form of which is 
Wittgenstein’s picture of a paradox.  That elusive and dark rule the rule-follower follows 
blindly does not really exist, because it is not only not the rule-follower—it is not anything 
at all.  Only through purpose can this ‘nothing’ then become something else—through the 
purposive negativity that constitutes the sign’s identity-in-difference and that is also called 
‘simple abstraction’.  But we say that this compliant rule is there and we think that it is 
what we are following when we follow the rule, and it is no wonder: this picture tells us 
what to say and what to think about the rule.  In fact, the sign itself is just such a 
paradoxical picture, just as the paradox in the picture shares the nature of metaphor, 
capturing meaning by being both what is there and not there at the same time.  And so the 
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compliant rule is really just metaphor after all—the picture of a paradox—and not a living 
rule like the pliant rule.  It was Wittgenstein’s error not to see this compliant rule for what 
it really is, since he only listened to what the compliant rule told him it was, and it told him 
it was a rule when it really was not.  He should have known better, just as he said he knew 
that “[a] picture held us captive.  And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language 
and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (PI 115)” 
 
Notes for Chapter Four 
1.  PI 265: “Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that exists only in our 
imagination.  A dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a word X by a word Y.  
But are we also to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the 
imagination? –“Well, yes; then it is a subjective justification.”—But justification consists 
in appealing to something independent.—“But surely I can appeal from one memory to 
another.  For example, I don’t know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train 
right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked.  Isn’t it the same 
here?”—No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct.  If the 
mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it 
confirm the correctness of the first memory?  (As if someone were to buy several copies of 
the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.) 
     Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of 
the result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment.” 
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